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 THE EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED FAIRNESS AND COMMUNICATION ON 
HONESTY AND COLLUSION IN A MULTI-AGENT SETTING 
Yue Zhang  
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
Agents who perform interrelated tasks or work in similar local conditions often observe 
each other's actions and local signals. However, such information is often costly for the principal 
to obtain. Analytical models show that in such a situation, a peer reporting system with a 
verification mechanism (using one agent’s information to verify the other’s) and a reward for 
truthful whistle blowing can induce agents to report honestly and thereby help the principal 
achieve the first-best outcome. However, behavioral research suggests that the agents’ perception 
regarding the fairness of the principal as well as cheap talk among agents may affect both how 
honestly agents report and how willing they are to blow the whistle on their peers. The results of 
the experiment show that under a peer reporting system, the agents' perception regarding the 
fairness of the principal positively affects the agents’ reporting honesty and negatively affects the 
agents’ rate of collusion. Communication between agents decreases their honesty and their 
whistle blowing when the principal is perceived as unfair, but not when the principal is perceived 
as fair.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A considerable body of experimental accounting research has focused on how different 
incentive contracts and various contextual factors affect agents’ honesty in managerial reporting. 
Research in this area typically focuses on a one-principal, one-agent setting in which the agent 
possesses local information that is unknown to the principal.  However, in practice, budgeting 
often takes place in multidivisional firms and involves interactions among many agents (Arya, 
Glover and Young 1996). In addition, due to job rotations, interrelated tasks, social interactions, 
similar environmental conditions or adjacent work locations, etc., agents often are aware of each 
other’s local production information. In other words, there often is low information asymmetry 
among these agents, although the degree of information asymmetry between the agents and the 
principal may be high. 
This richer setting presents the principal with a control opportunity. If the principal can 
successfully elicit information possessed by one agent about the other, the principal can greatly 
improve his/her contractual position at a relatively low cost. Several analytical modeling papers 
have investigated control issues in a multi-agent setting (see Demski and Sappington 1984; 
Demski et al. 1988; Ma 1988; Arya and Glover 1996; Fisher and Hughes 1997). While the 
assumptions and forms of these incentive systems vary, the general model is one in which each 
agent observes the other agent’s action or private information and truthfully reports it to the 
principal. The agents are compensated based on their peer's report. In this dissertation, this type 
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of incentive system is labeled as "the peer reporting system". Ma (1988) is a typical example of a 
peer reporting system. Ma (1988) is particularly appealing since it demonstrates conditions under 
which the principal can achieve the first-best result when agents are able to perfectly observe 
each other’s efforts. Ma (1988) originally investigates a moral hazard problem. By logical 
extension, the model can also be applied to a multi-agent, information asymmetry setting and 
facilitate the principal to enforce truthful budgetary reporting from agents.   
Ma's (1988) peer reporting system is based on the assumption that agents are wealth 
maximizers. Therefore, agents are assumed to always prefer to convey to the principal any 
information they gather about their peers given the financial reward for doing so. In addition, Ma 
(1988) assumes that agents will choose their strategies without communicating with each other 
(Towry 2003). However, it is often socially and psychologically costly to blow the whistle on 
others, and agents may prefer not to reveal their peer's information to the principal despite the 
financial reward. In addition, agents constantly interact with each other in practice, the 
interactions and communications among agents can allow them to form collusive agreements in 
cases where lying and covering for each other is economically beneficial to them.1 Conventional 
economic theory and behavioral decision theory make different assumptions regarding whether 
the above issues can undermine the effectiveness of the peer reporting system. Conventional 
economic theory assumes wealth maximization and thereby assumes away the 
social/psychological costs of whistle blowing and the potential impact of these costs on the 
effectiveness of the system. Conventional economic theory further assumes that, as long as 
                                                 
1 A "collusive agreement" or "collusion" refers to coordination among the agents that is not in the principal’s best 
interest. In this study, both terms specifically refer to the case where both agents agree to overstate their budgeted 
costs and cover for each other. 
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communication is “cheap talk”, collusive communication between agents will not undermine the 
peer reporting system.2
In contrast to conventional economic theory, theory from social psychology and evidence 
from the experimental cheap talk literature suggest that depending on the situation, both the cost 
of blowing the whistle on others and non-binding communication between agents may reduce the 
deterrent effect of whistle blowing and render the peer reporting system less effective. A key 
situational factor advocated by the social psychology literature is agents' perception regarding the 
fairness of the principal3. This literature suggests that agents’ perceived fairness of the principal 
affects both their own reporting honesty and their willingness to blow the whistle on a lying peer. 
In addition, agents’ perceived fairness of the principal affects the relationship between agent 
communication and the effectiveness of the peer reporting system. In particular, under the peer 
reporting system, communication between agents is predicted to negatively affect their reporting 
honesty and their rate of whistle blowing when they perceive the principal to be unfair, but not 
when they perceive the principal to be fair.  
This dissertation investigates whether and how the effectiveness of the peer reporting 
system is affected by agents’ perceived fairness of the principal and agents' ability to 
communicate in a multi-agent budgetary reporting setting. In order to answer the research 
question, I conduct an experiment with triads consisting of one owner (the principal) and two 
managers (the agents). Undergraduate students played the role of the owners and the managers. 
In the experiment, the hypothetical firm uses Ma’s (1988) peer reporting system to enforce 
truthful reports from managers. The experiment lasts eight periods. The participants are matched 
                                                 
2 Cheap talk refers to any costless, non-binding promise made by the players in a strategic game. 
 
3 In this dissertation, the agents’ perception regarding the fairness of the principal specifically refers to the agents’ 
perception of the fairness of the wage offered to them by the principal.  
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with different partners in each period. Participants in the experiment are randomly assigned into 
one of two communication conditions: the no communication condition and the communication 
condition. In both conditions, at the beginning of each experimental period, the owners are asked 
to choose a wage level (either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras) for the managers matched with them in 
that period. After learning their wages, managers in the no communication condition report their 
costs to the owner (in stage-one) and make a “whistle blowing” decision (in stage-two). The 
managers are unable to communicate with each other at any time. In the communication 
condition, after learning their wages, the two managers in each triad can anonymously 
communicate twice with each other (send a written message and make a written response) in 
every period, before they independently report their costs to the owner and subsequently make 
the “whistle blowing” decision. At the conclusion of the eighth period, participants in both 
conditions complete a post experimental questionnaire.  
This study consists of three independent variables. The first independent variable, agent 
communication (yes or no), is manipulated between-subjects by assigning each participant to one 
of the two communication conditions. The second independent variable, wage (fair or unfair), is 
measured by asking owners to choose a wage for the managers matched with them and ask 
managers to rate their perceived fairness of their owner based on the wage. The third 
independent variable, experimental period, is manipulated within-subjects and consists of eight 
levels. The major dependent variables are agents’ reporting honesty and their percentage of 
whistle blowing on lying peers. Results show that despite the peer reporting system and the high 
reward for whistle blowing, managers report less honestly when they perceive that the owner is 
unfair than when they perceive that the owner is fair. As predicted, when given the opportunity 
to communicate, managers send more collusive messages and form more collusive agreements 
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when they perceive that the owner is unfair than when they perceive that the owner is fair. The 
managers’ ability to communicate reduces both their honesty in reporting and their percentage of 
whistle blowing when the owner is perceived as unfair, but not when the owner is perceived as 
fair. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it addresses the call 
for experimental research to investigate multi-person environments (Sprinkle 2003). Compared 
with a single-person setting, there are additional problems to consider in a multi-person 
environment such as mutual monitoring among group members, improved risk sharing, free-
riding, competition, collusion, etc. This study experimentally examined mutual monitoring and 
collusion between agents and how contextual factors such as perceived fairness and agent 
communication can impact individuals’ behaviors in a multi-person budgeting setting. As 
pointed out by Fisher (1994) and Sprinkle (2003), experimental studies examining multi-person 
issues across difference production settings, group incentive schemes and communication and 
monitoring arrangements are valuable to accounting research.  
Second, this dissertation experimentally examines the effectiveness of a peer reporting 
system in eliciting truthful budgeting reports from agents and provides evidence that two factors, 
agents’ perceived fairness of the principal and the ability of agents to communicate, play 
important roles in determining agents’ honesty in reporting under a peer reporting system. By 
doing so, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of analyzing control systems in context. 
Additionally, this dissertation answers recent call for accounting research to combine theories 
from both economics and psychology to provide better insights into accounting issues (Luft 
1997; Moser 1998; Evans and Moser 2004). 
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Third, this dissertation has implications for the role of agent communication in 
organizations. Many organizations offer costly organized leisure time activities to their 
employees to encourage communication and cooperation among them. The expectation is that 
communication leads to knowledge sharing and enhances productivity in the workplace. 
However, agents may also cooperate (i.e., collude) to provide low effort and to enjoy private 
benefits at the expense of the organization. In contrast to prior research, which typically focuses 
on the productive side of agent communication, this study investigates the potentially counter-
productive side of agent communication, i.e., the possibility of agent collusion.  
Fourth, this dissertation also provides insight into the whistle blowing practice4. This 
study shows that in a controlled experiment where reputation formation is precluded, people are 
still reluctant to blow the whistle on their lying peers despite the high reward that encourages 
whistle blowing. Whistle blowing on a peer’s opportunistic behaviors is least likely to take place 
when the agents who can communicate with each other perceive the principal to be unfair. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature in accounting and economics and discusses the motivations of this dissertation. Chapter 
3 presents the multi-agent managerial reporting setting of this dissertation, applies Ma's (1988) 
peer reporting system to this setting, and develops predictions of the agents’ behavior under the 
peer reporting system based on the wealth maximizing assumption. Chapter 4 presents 
                                                 
4 Whistle Blowing is defined by Near and Miceli (1985) as “the disclosure of perceived wrongdoing by 
organizational members to parties who may be able to halt it.” The whistle blowing phenomenon aroused more 
public attention nowadays. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act included a groundbreaking provision protecting employees who 
blow the whistle on corporate fraud. These whistle-blower provisions provide broader remedies for employees than 
do other whistle-blower protection laws. Public companies are now required to write a corporate code of conduct 
that encourages employees to report potential financial, ethical, legal or other misconduct; to include a "no-
retaliation" policy and identify employees who are to receive complaints of whistle-blower retaliation; to establish a 
corporate compliance telephone hotline and/or name a corporate compliance or ethics officer; and to keep well-
documented personnel files, disciplinary records and termination records---Forbes, June 18, 2003. 
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behavioral theories and evidence from social psychology, accounting, the empirical whistle 
blowing and cheap talk literature regarding the roles of agent communication and their perceived 
fairness of the principal. Chapter 5 develops the behavioral hypotheses of this dissertation. 
Chapter 6 describes the research design and the experimental procedures. Chapter 7 presents the 
results and statistical analyses. Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes this dissertation.  
Experimental instructions and post experimental questionnaires for both experimental conditions 
are presented in the Appendix.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
This dissertation experimentally explores the effect of a multi-agent incentive system-
specifically, the peer reporting system, on enforcing honesty in multi-agent managerial reporting. 
This chapter reviews studies in the incentive contracting literature that inspired this dissertation. 
It starts with a brief review of the relevant single agent experiments in this area, followed by a 
review of both the analytical and the experimental studies involving contracting with multiple 
agents. This chapter highlights several issues that have not been thoroughly addressed in the 
literature and illustrates how this dissertation may contribute to our understanding of those 
issues. 
2.1 SINGLE AGENT STUDIES 
A series of managerial accounting experiments have explored the effects of incentives on 
agents’ reporting and production decisions. An important focus of these studies has been to 
assess the relative merits of alternative compensation schemes for eliciting agent’s private 
information while simultaneously using that information to provide agents with production 
incentives (Evans and Moser 2004). Earlier experiments typically manipulate the incentive 
structure or the information environment and explore the extent to which individuals create the 
maximum potential slack through their budgetary report as the analytical models predict (Young 
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1985; Chow, Cooper and Waller 1988; Waller 1988). Various contract forms have been studied 
including truth-inducing schemes and slack-inducing schemes in a single-agent environment. 
Results show that individuals create significantly less budgetary slack than the models predict. 
Among the explanations offered for these results are that individuals' preferences include not 
only wealth and leisure, but also equity or honesty (Covaleski, Evans, Luft and Shields, 2005). 
Later experimental studies explore how factors other than conventional monetary 
incentive can systematically affect agents’ reporting behavior and firm profit. For example, 
Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) report the results of three experiments that examine 
how preferences for wealth and honesty together affect managerial reporting. They find that 
agent participants often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports. Their level of 
honesty generally does not decrease as the payoff to lying increases. However, they report less 
honestly under the contract that provides a smaller share of the total surplus to the agent than 
under one that provides a larger share, suggesting that the extent of honesty may depend on how 
the surplus is divided between the agent and the firm. The results of their experiments indicate 
that a modified version of the optimal agency contract, which makes use of participants’ 
preferences for honest reporting, yields higher firm profit than either the optimal agency contract 
or the contract that relies exclusively on honest reporting. The paper suggests that agent’s 
willingness to lie is endogenous and the extent of honesty depends on the contracts they are 
facing and the situations they are in.   
Stevens (2002) examines how reputation concern (socially mediated concern for having a 
positive public image) and ethical concern (internally mediated concern for doing the right thing) 
affect agents’ budgetary reporting. Results suggest that the participants’ reputation concerns are 
negatively related with the degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, 
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while their ethical concerns operate equally for all levels of information asymmetry. The results 
show that both reputation and ethical concerns significantly reduce the level of slack agents 
create.   
Rankin, Schwartz and Young (2003) investigate whether non-binding budgetary 
announcement made by principals can reduce agents’ consumption of slack in a participatory 
budgeting setting. They find that principals use nonbinding announcement as a bluff in an 
attempt to convince agents that they will reject a profitable project more often than they intend. 
This strategy appears to be valuable to the principal. Specifically, agents do not treat the 
nonbinding announcements as cheap talk and reduce their level of slack accordingly. As a result, 
principals in the nonbinding announcement condition significantly outperform those in the no-
announcement condition. The difference in principal welfare between the nonbinding 
announcement and the binding announcement conditions is much less than predictions made 
from standard game-theoretic assumptions.  
Hannan, Rankin and Towry (2005) experimentally examine the effect of reductions in 
information asymmetry on managerial honesty in participatory budgeting when the information 
is non-contractible. The paper provides evidence that agents trade off their preferences for wealth 
and positive social impression (appearing honest). Results show that the effect of a reduction in 
information asymmetry depends on the weight the agent places on each of the two preferences 
and on the wealth that must be foregone in order to appear honest. The paper shows that 
reductions in information asymmetry can increase agent honesty, because agents care about the 
impressions principals have of them, and are willing to sacrifice wealth in order to appear honest. 
However, as the level of information asymmetry decreases, agents must give up more and more 
wealth in order to appear honest. If the cost of appearing honest becomes too great, agents will 
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simply ignore their preference for appearing honest, and report so they maximize their wealth. 
Importantly, a trade-off between wealth and appearing honest opens the possibility that 
reductions in information asymmetry might even decrease reporting honesty. This is because as 
the information system becomes more precise, more agents may want to abandon their goals of 
impression management and choose wealth-maximizing reports. This study suggests that 
preferences for honesty are fragile and sensitive to subtle contextual features.  
All the above studies contribute to the growing literature examining the roles of 
psychological/contextual factors that conventional economic models do not predict will 
systematically influence managerial behaviors. Understanding these factors can lead to more 
efficient contracts which reduce the emphasis on explicit controls and focus also on intrinsic 
preferences and motivation (Hannan et al., 2005). By bringing together agency theory and 
behavioral decision theory, these studies contribute to building an improved theory of 
participative budgeting (Evans and Moser 2004). 
2.2 MULTI-AGENT STUDIES 
The incentive contracting studies in the previous section focus on a single agent 
environment. In business practice, incentive contracting and budgeting usually involves multiple 
groups and multiple agents. Prior experimental research has not fully explored the multi-person 
nature characterizing many business situations. As pointed out in Baiman (1990) and Sprinkle 
(2003), compared with a single-person setting, there are additional issues to consider in a multi-
person environment. These include mutual monitoring among group members, improved risk 
sharing, free-riding, competition, collusion, etc. None of these multi-person issues has been fully 
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explored in the accounting literature. We also do not know whether and how the 
psychological/contextual factors that can systematically influence managerial reporting in a 
single agent environment would have different effects in a multi-agent setting. These factors 
include individual's preference for honesty and fairness, communication and trust among 
individuals, social impression management, etc. In an attempt to improve our understanding on 
the above mentioned issues, this dissertation explores how two factors, namely agents’ perceived 
fairness of the principal and agents' ability to communicate, affect mutual monitoring and 
colluding between agents under the peer reporting system. Next, this section presents the 
analytical literature on contracting with multiple agents, introduces the peer reporting model and 
reviews experimental research in accounting that involves multiple agents. In section 2.3, I 
discuss how this dissertation is distinguished from and contributes to the existing multi-agent 
research.  
2.2.1 Agency Theory on Contracting with Multiple Agents 
The analytical literature has identified several ways in which the principal can improve 
his/her contracting position by taking advantage of the multi-agent setting. These include 
promoting knowledge sharing and cooperation among agents (Tirole 1988, Itoh 1991); using 
relative performance evaluation when agents share some common uncertainty (Holmstrom 
1982); allowing risk sharing among agents when the agents are risk averse (Villadsen 1995); and 
encouraging peer mutual monitoring when agents can observe each other (Ma 1988). This 
dissertation focuses on the mutual monitoring aspect of the multi-agent environment. In practice, 
agents often can observe each others’ actions and local signals although such information can be 
costly for the principal to obtain.  In such a situation, encouraging mutual monitoring among 
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agents and eliciting information possessed by one agent about another can be very useful to the 
principal.  
 Researchers have long noted the potential value of mutual monitoring (e.g., Fama and 
Jensen 1983; Kandal and Lazear 1992). Most of the analytical literature on mutual monitoring 
focuses on peer monitoring in teams, where the action of one agent affects the well being of 
other agents (Bowles and Gintis 1998, Carpenter 1999). Many mutual monitoring systems in 
teams tie each agent’s pay to his/her team members’ efforts. This provides incentives for team 
self-management and encourages a tit-for-tat strategy among the agents (Tirole 1988; Varian 
1990; Kandal and Lazear 1992; Itoh 1993; Arya, Fellingham and Glover 1997). For example, a 
mutual monitoring system proposed by Arya, Fellingham and Glover (1997) provides output-
based team incentives in the odd periods, meaning that each agent’s compensation is increasing 
in team output and that each agent prefers the other agent working to the other agent shirking. In 
the even periods, the system works in such a way that each agent’s net profit is determined solely 
by the other agent’s decision. By doing so, the principal creates an opportunity for agents to 
punish the teammate in the even periods if the teammate shirks in the odd periods. 
As indicated by Bowles et al. (2001), the crucial condition for agents to play a tit-for-tat 
strategy is that agents are residual claimants to the team’s output. When this is true, shirking 
and/or other dishonest behaviors in the workplace by one agent impose costs on other team 
members. The mutual monitoring system that relies on the tit-for-tat strategy among team 
members (hereafter the tit-for-tat system) may fail in settings where (a) agents who share 
information about each other are not compensated based on joint production outcome and/or (b) 
agents can benefit more by colluding with each other and shirking together than by engaging in 
team self-management desired by the principal.  
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The analytical modeling literature (Demski and Sappington 1984; Demski et al. 1988; Ma 
1988, Arya, Glover and Young 1996; Fischer and Hughes 1997) proposes another type of mutual 
monitoring system that can improve the principal’s contractual position in a more general setting 
which does not require agents to be residual claimants of team outputs. This type of mutual 
monitoring system is referred to as the “peer reporting system” in this dissertation. A common 
theme of the peer reporting system is that when there is low (or no) information asymmetry 
between two agents, the principal can improve his/her welfare by encouraging peer reporting and 
basing each agent’s compensation on the peer’s report. The agents are essentially whistle 
blowers, who pass along to the principal any information they gather about their coworkers 
(Towry 2003). The principal can extract private information at a lower cost when agent B reveals 
agent A’s private information than when agent A reveals his/her own private information.  
For example, Demski and Sappington (1984) investigate contracting with multiple agents 
when they have correlated private local signals. They show that the principal can extracts rents 
from these agents by requiring each agent to pick a lottery contingent on the other agent’s output. 
By picking this lottery, the agents reveal each other’s private information to the principal. 
Compared with treating the agents independently, this contract limits the rents that the agents 
might otherwise be able to command with their private information. However, there exists an 
equilibrium in which the agents can claim to have observed the smallest realization of the local 
signal. In order for the above unwanted equilibrium to be dominated, the principal can treat the 
agents asymmetrically. That is, the principal can pay a little more to one agent to make him both 
a productive agent and an information provider. This dual-role agent is induced to report 
truthfully as a dominant strategy. The other agent is only constrained to report truthfully as the 
best response.  
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Ma (1988) proposes a mutual monitoring contract in a setting where two agents can 
perfectly observe each other’s actions. Specifically, Ma (1988) suggests a two-stage mechanism. 
In stage-one, the two agents select their own actions. In stage-two, one of the agents reports to 
the principal the actions taken by both agents in stage-one and the other agent verifies the report. 
Each agent’s compensation is based on the information provided by the other agent. An 
important feature of this contract is that if the second agent challenges the first agent's report, the 
second agent is required to accept an output-based lottery which is valuable only if the first agent 
did in fact lie. Under this contract, as long as the agents are rational players, they always prefer 
to choose the principal's desired action in stage-one; in stage-two, the first agent truthful reports 
and the second agent verifies the report to the principal. The model strictly improves the 
principal’s welfare when compared with one that treats the agents independently. Ma (1988)’s 
model is particularly appealing because it provides a first-best solution. This is because the risk 
averse agents are compensated based on reports of actions, not on stochastic outcomes. The 
agents take no risks in equilibrium.  
 Fischer and Hughes (1997) extend Ma (1988)’s setting by considering the more common 
situation where agents privately observe imperfect signals regarding each other's actions before 
outcomes are realized. Similar to Ma, they assume that each agent reports on the signal they 
observe. Each agent's compensation is a function of the signals reported and the output produced. 
Since the agents are risk averse and their compensation partially depends on the output produced, 
the agents will take some risk and this has to be compensated by the principal. Therefore, Fischer 
and Hughes (1997) do not provide a fist-best solution. However, they demonstrate conditions 
under which truthful reporting and desired actions can be implemented at nearly no additional 
cost with their compensation scheme.  
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 The common theme of the aforementioned peer reporting systems is that they all rely on 
one agent reporting on other agents’ private information or action to the principal. The peer 
reporting systems are based on two fundamental assumptions. First, agents are wealth 
maximizers. Second, agents will independently choose their strategies to maximize their 
individual wealth. As a result, agents will always prefer to be the principal’s information 
providers and in equilibrium, all these models are tacit collusion proof.  However, as pointed out 
by Towry (2003), off-equilibrium collusion is still possible under these models. Specifically, 
agents can explicitly or implicitly side contract with each other, agreeing to both lie and then 
cover for each other to achieve economic benefits. The possibility of off-equilibrium collusion 
suggests the importance of studying these peer reporting systems in context. One of the major 
goals of this dissertation is to investigate under which circumstances agents are more likely to 
engage in off-equilibrium collusion. Before I elaborate on the objectives of this dissertation, I 
will first review previous experimental studies that investigate different aspects of the multi-
agent environment. The focus of the review is on research that has enriched our knowledge of 
multi-agent issues by bringing both the economic and the social/psychological perspectives into 
their studies.  
2.2.2 Multi-Agent Experiments 
In an extensive review of experimental research in managerial accounting, Sprinkle 
(2003) points out that only a few studies have examined incentive issues in multi-agent settings, 
and it is unclear how the theoretical benefits and costs associated with multi-agent environment 
translate into realized performance. More experimental studies examining multi-agent issues 
(such as cooperation, competition, mutual monitoring, risk sharing, free riding, collusion, etc.) 
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across different production settings, incentive schemes and communication and monitoring 
arrangements would be valuable to accounting research (Fisher, 1994; Nalbantian and Schotter, 
1997; Sprinkle 2003). 
Early experiments involving multiple agents include Waller and Bishop (1990), Chow, 
Hirst and Shields (1994) and Young, Fisher and Lindquist (1993). The first two studies 
experimentally examine the effects of alternative incentive schemes for controlling agents’ 
opportunistic behaviors in intra-firm resource allocation settings. Both papers test the effect of a 
multi-agent incentive scheme, specifically, the Groves Scheme, in comparison with the effects of 
the single-agent incentive schemes.5 These papers are among the pioneers that extend their scope 
of study to multi-agent situations. However, both studies treat multiple agents as a collection of 
individuals and do not encompass in their experiments important features characterizing the 
multi-agent environment, such as interactions and social comparisons among individuals, 
cooperation and competition among peers, etc. In addition, as pointed out in Evans and Moser 
(2004), the multi-agent incentive scheme (i.e. the Grove Scheme) studied in these papers are not 
used in practice, nor is it demonstrated to be able to improve welfare over currently existing 
schemes. As a result, these studies improved our understanding of multi-person issues only to a 
limited degree.  Young et al. (1993) investigate how intra-group cooperation and performance 
feedback received from inter-group competition affect group performance and slack. Their 
experiment captures some important behavioral aspects of the multi-person environment. 
However, the paper lacks any clear economic benchmark predictions against which to compare 
the behaviors observed in their experiment. Therefore, although the study identifies a potentially 
                                                 
5 Under the Grove Scheme, a unit manager’s pay is linear in the sum of his or her unit’s actual profit and the other 
unit’s budgeted profit (Waller and Bishop 1990). 
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interesting challenge to existing theory, it does not take advantage of the opportunity to advance 
theory in a structured, incremental fashion (Evans and Moser 2004). 
More recent experiments involving multiple agents capture more elements specific to the 
multi-agent environment in their designs and more successfully integrate both economic theory 
and behavioral science. Fisher, Maine, Peffer and Sprinkle (2002) and Hannan, Rankin and 
Towry (2005) both investigate the effect of explicit and implicit competition among multiple 
agents in the participative budgeting setting. Fisher et al. (2002) examine whether two 
practices—using budgets to allocate scarce resources and providing information about co-
workers—reduce budget slack. Both practices arise naturally in budget settings involving 
multiple agents. Both practices are expected to increase competition among agents. The results 
of the experiment show that when the principal can allocate more resources to the more 
productive agent, agents build significantly less slack into their budgets. The results also indicate 
that a non-economic factor, i.e., providing agents information about their co-workers’ budget 
proposals, promotes the desire to outbid co-workers, thereby motivating agents to reduce budget 
slack. Hannan, Rankin and Towry (2005) investigate how increasing the principal’s span of 
control (changing from a single-agent setting to a multi-agent setting) can improve the 
effectiveness of the budgeting process. They find that the principal in the multi-agent situation is 
more willing to incur a cost in order to punish an agent who is assumed to have incorporated 
excess slack in the budget, i.e., the principal is tougher. In addition, agents anticipate that the 
principal will be more willing to reject profitable budget proposals to enforce norms in the multi-
agent condition. This anticipation creates implicit competition among agents to propose a project 
with a lower cost compared to other agents and results in more honest budget report. Both Fisher 
et al. (2002) and Hannan et al. (2005) suggest that prior single agent studies may have 
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underestimated the importance of social factors in eliciting truthful reporting from agents. In 
particular, agents’ reporting is influenced by the social pressure due to the presence of other 
agents. Together, these papers suggest that the influence of social norms on agents’ behaviors is 
even greater in the multi-agent setting than in the single agent setting. 
None of the above papers involving multi-agent consider a phenomenon characterizing 
many multi-agent environments. That is, there often is low (or no) information asymmetry 
among multiple agents. As discussed earlier, in practice, agents often can observe each other’s 
actions and local signals. The principal can take advantage of the low information asymmetry 
among agents and encourage peer mutual monitoring. Two studies that have investigated mutual 
monitoring in multi-agent settings and therefore are most relevant to this dissertation are by 
Nikias (2002) and Towry (2003). Both papers experimentally test mutual monitoring models 
proposed in the analytical literature. Nikias (2002) focuses on mutual monitoring issues in a team 
setting. He experimentally studies the effect of the tit-for-tat system in a two-period game. The 
system is based on Arya et al. (1997). Under this system, one agent has the chance to punish the 
other agent in the second period, if the other agent shirks in the first period. Nikias (2002) finds 
that, consistent with Arya et al. (1997), team members play the punishment strategies in the 
second period if their teammates shirk in the first period. However, inconsistent with the model, 
agents only infrequently coordinate to the Pareto-dominant strategy (work in both periods) 
without pre-play communication. In fact, when there is no pre-play communication, the agents’ 
proportion of working under the tit-for-tat system is significantly lower than that under the 
individual incentive system. When the agents are allowed to engage in pre-play communication, 
their coordination rate under the tit-for-tat system increases significantly, and the proportion of 
working under the tit-for-tat system is not significantly different from that under the individual 
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incentive system. The paper suggests that coordination is a decisive issue in the success of the 
tit-for-tat system. Providing individuals with an opportunity to communicate facilitates 
coordination and is an important factor to consider in the design of mutual monitoring contracts. 
Towry (2003) also examines mutual monitoring in teams. She experimentally 
investigates both types of mutual monitoring systems discussed in section 2.2.1: the tit-for-tat 
system and the peer reporting system. She manipulates team identity (high or low) among team 
members and finds that monitoring system interacts with team identity to influence team 
members’ effort choice. Specifically, a high team identity leads to increased effort levels under 
the tit-for-tat system. However, a high team identity leads to decreased effort levels under the 
peer reporting system. Further analyses show that, under the tit-for-tat system, high team identity 
increases the level of coordination between team members, which in turn increases their choice 
of the mutually beneficial outcomes—cooperate and contribute high effort in both the odd and 
even periods. In contrast, under the peer reporting system, high team identity increases the level 
of collusion between team members, which in turn leads to lower effort and false reporting in 
teams. These findings are particularly important with regard to the role of team identity, a factor 
that analytical models do not predict will systematically affect agents’ behaviors. This anomaly 
presented in Towry (2003) provides valuable insight into how the theory of mutual monitoring 
can potentially be modified to lead to better predictions of the agents’ actual behaviors.  
Both Nikias (2002) and Towry (2003) contribute to our understanding of the effect of 
peer mutual monitoring on controlling moral hazard problems in teams. Both studies address a 
phenomenon ubiquitous in practice that has been neglected in prior experimental research in 
management accounting. That is, there often is lower information asymmetry among agents than 
there is between the agents and the principal, and agents are more likely than the principal to be 
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aware of their coworkers’ opportunistic behaviors. As a result, peer mutual monitoring, either 
formal or informal, can be valuable to firms. In addition, both studies point out that the 
effectiveness of peer monitoring is contingent not only on incentive contracting designs, but also 
on a variety of contextual, psychological or social factors. Further research is needed to combine 
theories from diverse disciplines and examine mutual monitoring across a range of production 
settings and social contexts. 
2.3 MOTIVATIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is an extension to the aforementioned line of research. Instead of 
addressing how mutual monitoring can help the moral hazard problems in teams, it investigates 
how mutual monitoring can help solve the information asymmetry problem in multi-agent 
participative budgeting. The setting studied involves two managers who know their own and 
each other’s private information reporting to an owner. The setting is an extension of Antle and 
Eppen (1985)’s owner-manager model. The details of the setting are described in Chapter 3.  
 I am not aware of any experiment that addresses mutual monitoring issues in a multi-
agent participative budgeting setting. However, this setting is quite relevant to business practices. 
In the workplace, budgeting often involves multiple agents who can better observe each other's 
actions and local signals than the principal can. Many companies have a budget review meeting 
during which agents present their budget proposals in the presence of peer agents and the 
principal (Finney, 1993, 1994). Due to similarities in the work environment or their prior work 
experience, peer agents often have more insight into the veracity of the data presented by the 
other agent in the budget report than the principal does. When an agent in a multidivisional firm 
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reports his local information to the principal, his capacity to misrepresent local information can 
potentially be seriously undermined if there are other agents (either from the same division or 
from other divisions) who can observe his local information. Of course, this depends on the 
willingness of the other agents to report their knowledge to the principal. The first objective of 
this dissertation is to introduce peer mutual monitoring to the participative budgeting setting and 
study how peer mutual monitoring can help induce honesty in multi-agent reporting.  
As discussed before, there are two basic types of mutual monitoring systems: the tit-for-
tat system that relies on team self-management and tit-for-tat strategy among team members, and 
the peer reporting system that relies on whistle blowing on peer’s misconduct. This dissertation 
chooses to study the effect of the peer reporting system in the multi-agent budgeting setting. In 
the setting of interest, agents who can observe each other’s information are not from the same 
divisions (teams). Since these agents are not from the same divisions (teams), their 
compensations are not contingent on each other’s performance. Therefore, they do not have to 
share gains or bear losses resulting from the other agent’s opportunistic behavior.6 As a result, 
these agents do not have incentives to punish the other agent’s opportunistic behavior. Hence, the 
tit-for-tat mutual monitoring system would not work in the setting studied in this dissertation. 
This is even truer when agents can work together for their mutual benefit by colluding to build in 
slack and consume more perquisites. In contrast, the peer reporting system suggested by the 
analytical literature does not rely on gain/loss sharing in teams and can be very useful in this 
budgeting setting. Firms that face persistent problems with budget slack may wish to provide 
monetary rewards to encourage agents to blow the whistle on other agents’ dishonest reports.  
                                                 
6 In my setting, scarce resource is not a problem and capital is not rationed. Agents in this dissertation do not have to 
compete for limited resources. If one agent overstates the resources he needs, the amount of resources the other 
agent may receive will be not affected.  
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A secondary reason I choose to study the peer reporting system is because the use of such 
systems is becoming increasingly widespread in practice. The peer reporting system is 
essentially a whistle blowing system; an internal control tool that has been used in firms for a 
long time and has been promoted for broader implementation since the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act. An empirical study of the Fortune 1000 by Weaver et al. (1999) indicates that most 
of these companies have some kind of corporate whistle blowing functions to receive reports 
about corporate wrongdoing from employees. Many firms provide monetary rewards to 
encourage whistle blowing. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act includes a groundbreaking provision 
protecting employees who blow the whistle on corporate fraud. Public companies are now 
required to write a corporate code of conduct that encourages employees to report potential 
financial, ethical, legal or other misconduct and to establish a corporate compliance telephone 
hotline and/or name a corporate compliance or ethics officer (Forbes, June 18, 2003).7
To study how peer reporting can help induce honesty in multi-agent budgeting, it is 
important to investigate conditions under which peer reporting are more or less useful. Thus, the 
second objective of this dissertation is to explore contextual factors that can systematically affect 
the effectiveness of the peer reporting system. As mentioned in section 2.2.1, the problem 
associated with the peer reporting system is that it faces the potential threat of off-equilibrium 
                                                 
7 Miceli and Near (1992) suggests that most leaders of organizations want to encourage valid whistle-blowing. 
While whistle-blowing may be threatening to some managers or co-workers, it often can improve long-term 
organizational effectiveness, because whistle-blowers may suggest solutions to organizational problems. More 
importantly, organization members, stockholders, and society in general, can benefit from the cessation of 
organizational wrongdoing. Potential costs of whistle blowing include increased level of mistrust among colleagues. 
However, research suggests that organizations that specifically encourage reporting and specify a channel for 
blowing the whistle do not experience tension among employees (Miceli and Near 1992). There is also evidence that 
the climate for whistle-blowing is associated with higher levels of employee satisfaction (Gorden et al., 1988; 
Zalkind 1987).  In addition, according to a survey by Keenan (1988), 95% of the respondents personally expressed 
approval of the practice of employees reporting illegal or wasteful activities within their company’s operations. 96% 
of these managers thought organization employees should be encouraged to report illegal or wasteful activities and 
56% indicated very strong feelings that internal whistle blowing is in the best interest of the organization. 
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collusion between agents. In the budgeting setting, this means that agents can agree to build in 
slack into their budgets and cover for each other. The analytical models do not consider the 
likelihood of off-equilibrium collusion, and, therefore, do not look into the processes through 
which such collusion could emerge. This dissertation explores situations under which agents are 
more likely to engage in off-equilibrium collusion. In other words, the situations under which the 
peer reporting system is more likely to fail. Studying these contextual factors both can provide 
better advice to practitioners who establish managerial control systems and offer useful insights 
for theoretical advancement.  
The first contextual factor studied is the relationship between agents and the principal (as 
reflected by agents' perceived fairness of the principal). Towry (2003) studies how the 
relationship between agents (as reflected by team identity) can affect the peer reporting system in 
a team setting. In her study, the principal does not play an active role. However, I argue that the 
principal’s role can be very important in determining the success or failure of the peer reporting 
system. Organizational structures involve both the principal and the agents. In modern business, 
the relationship between agents is often intertwined with the relationship between agents and the 
principal. Together, these two types of relationships affect individual behaviors. Under the peer 
reporting system, agents often have to make two competing choices: whether to cooperate 
(collude) with other agents (by covering for each other’s opportunistic behaviors) or to cooperate 
with the principal (by policing other agents and being the principal’s information provider). As 
will be elaborated in Chapter 4, in such a situation, agent’s choices can be systematically 
affected by agent’s perceived fairness of the principal. In the current study, the principal plays an 
active role by choosing a wage level for the agents. Agents’ perceived fairness of the principal in 
this study is based on the wage they receive from the principal. Much evidence in prior literature 
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suggests that the agency relationship is significantly affected by distributive concerns. Agents 
take into account the fairness associated with the payment they receive from the principal. 
Agents’ concerns for fairness result in their reciprocating behaviors and affect their willingness 
to cooperate with the principal, thereby impacting the effectiveness of the peer reporting system.  
The second contextual factor is the effect of non-binding communication between agents. 
Prior studies (Kachelmeier 1994, Rankin et al. 2003, Nikias 2002, Towry 2003) suggest that non-
binding communication can play an important role in coordinating individuals’ actions. 
Coordination between agents is an important factor in determining agents’ off-equilibrium 
collusion under the peer reporting system (Towry 2003). In practice, agents communicate with 
each other frequently. However, communication is generally missing from multi-agent studies in 
accounting. Prior research normally assumes that there is no communication among agents 
(Towry 2003). Without communication, agents in these studies can not replicate agents in the 
real business environment (Birnberg et al. 1970). Additionally, having the communication 
condition in the current study allows me to investigate whether agents will take into account the 
way the principal behaves when they have the chance to communicate (collude) with their peers, 
in other words, whether communication between agents is affected by agents’ perceived fairness 
of the principal.  The no communication condition in the experiment is used as a benchmark. 
Furthermore, the no communication condition permits one to observe the power of fairness norm 
in coordinating agents’ behaviors in a multi-person environment, when agents cannot explicitly 
coordinate their actions.  
This dissertation builds on theories from both economics and behavioral sciences, 
suggesting that insights from each can help us better understand mutual monitoring in 
organizations. In the following chapter, I introduce the economic perspectives on the 
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effectiveness of the peer reporting system and on the roles of non-binding agent communication 
and agents’ perceived fairness of the principal. In Chapter 4, I introduce behavioral theories on 
the roles of fairness and communication, and review the relevant experimental literature.  
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
In this chapter, I describe the multi-agent, managerial reporting setting of this dissertation 
and apply the peer reporting system to this setting. I then develop predictions regarding agents’ 
behaviors under the peer reporting system based on the wealth maximizing assumption. These 
wealth maximizing predictions will provide a clear benchmark against which to compare agents’ 
actual behaviors in my experiment.  
3.1 SETTING 
The setting in this dissertation is an extension of Antle and Eppen's (1985) owner-
manager model of the budgeting process. In Antle and Eppen (1985), project completion requires 
a manager's presence and funding is provided by the owner. The cost of the project is uniformly 
distributed as c Є (cmin, cmax), and revenue, R, equals cmax. The expected total surplus from the 
project is given by R-E(c). Revenue and the probability distribution over costs are common 
knowledge. However, only the manager knows the actual cost. Because of the manager's private 
information, the owner uses participatory budgeting to elicit a "cost report" from the manager. 
The setting described in this dissertation differs from Antle and Eppen (1985) in that 
there are two managers. The owner elicits information from both managers, A and B.  The cost 
of project A is uniformly distributed as cA Є (cAmin, cAmax); the cost of project B is uniformly 
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distributed as cB Є (cBmin, cBmax). The revenue of project A, RA, is equal to cAmax; the revenue of 
project B, RB, is equal to cBmax. The firm’s expected total surplus from the project is given by RA – 
E (cA) + RB – E (cB ). Both projects' revenue and the probability distribution over costs are common 
knowledge. However, only the managers know the projects’ actual costs. That is, the managers 
know their own actual cost and can perfectly observe the other’s actual cost.  
Under the assumption that both the owner and the managers have utility only for wealth, 
manager A and manager B will submit the highest feasible cost reports (i.e., cAmax and cBmax, 
respectively) to the owner if there is no control system in place. Therefore, the managers 
appropriate the entire surplus from the projects.  
3.2 APPLY MA (1988)'S MODEL TO THE SETTING  
To resolve the problem noted above, the owner could introduce a peer reporting system 
into the above setting. The peer reporting system selected in this dissertation is based on Ma 
(1988). Ma (1988)’s model is chosen because 1), it provides a first-best solution; 2), it has an 
intuitive appeal and can be examined experimentally; and 3), it represents the whistle blowing 
practice frequently observed in practice. Ma (1988) originally investigates a moral hazard 
problem. Under Ma (1988)’s system, each agent’s compensation is based on the report filed by 
the other agent. The principal enforces the veracity of the agents' reports in such a way that, if 
one agent accuses the other of lying, the accusing agent is required to accept an output-based 
lottery which is valuable only if the other agent did in fact lie. An alternative way to verify the 
accusation, as suggested by Towry (2003), is for the firm to employ an auditor. The auditor is 
called only if one agent accuses the other of lying. The accusing agent is then rewarded if the 
 28 
auditor determines that the accusation is truthful and penalized if the accusation is false. One 
apparent disadvantage of using an auditor as opposed to using a lottery to enforce truthful 
whistle blowing is that the principal would have to pay the auditor, making it a costly solution. 
However, if agents are rational players, they will always prefer to truthfully report their peer’s 
action to the principal to obtain the reward. By backward induction, the threat of peer reporting 
will deter agents from shirking in the first place. Therefore, in equilibrium, no whistle blowing 
will have to take place and the auditor is never called. The off-equilibrium possibility of an audit 
is sufficient to induce truthful reporting by both agents. From the principal's perspective, this 
approach improves her welfare when compared with a simple one that treats agents 
independently and audit every report from agents.  
By logical extension, Ma’s model can also be applied to the information asymmetry case 
in this dissertation. Assume that the owner utilizes the two managers’ knowledge about each 
other to enforce truthful reporting. Assume that the owner asks each manager to report their own 
cost, and then uses the other manager’s reaction as a policing device. One manager’s pay 
depends on the other manager’s verification. Specifically, if manager B states that manager A 
honestly reported the cost, manager A receives his reservation utility payment, w, and will be 
reimbursed for the production cost he reported. If B states that A overstated the cost, A will 
receive his reservation utility payment, w, and be fined f for overstating. Incentives to B's 
verification are provided by demanding that any accusation be supported by an audit. If B’s 
accusation is proved to be right, then B is provided a bonus, b; if not, then B has to pay a penalty, 
p, for falsely accusing A.8
                                                 
8 An important feature of this system is that the audit only takes place when one manager accuses the other of 
overstating. From the owner's perspective, the optimal approach is to audit only when there is an accusation, because 
under this approach, the audit only occurs off-equilibrium. 
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This monitoring system involves a two-stage game. That is, each manager needs to make 
two sequential choices: either to honestly report or overstate his own cost in stage-one; and either 
to tell the principal that the other manager was honest or dishonest in stage-two. 
Given this peer reporting system, a manager's expected payoff is determined by two 
factors: (1) how the other manager reports on him, and (2) how he reports on the other manager. 
Specifically, for any manager i (i=A,B) 
Depending on (1), manager i receives:  
  w + (ri - ci)   if manager j (j=A, B; j≠i) reports manager i as honest   
  w + (ri - ci)- f = w - f
9 if manager j reports manager i as dishonest 
 Depending on (2), manager i receives: 
 b  If manager i reports manager j as dishonest and the audit shows that j is dishonest 
 -p  If manager i reports manager j as dishonest and the audit shows that j is honest 
 0 If manager i reports manager j as honest 
w: reservation utility payment;  
ci: actual total cost for division i;  
ri: resources provided to division i by the owner;   
f: Fine for overstating;  
b: bonus for truthful accusation (whistle blowing); (f ≥b>0)10
p: penalty for false accusation; p>0  
In this study, the following specific parameters are used, resulting in the normal form 
decision table presented in Table 1-Panel A. 
                                                 
9 If manager j reports that manager i is dishonest, an audit will take place and the resource transferred to division I, 
ri, will be equal to the actual cost incurred, ci. 
 
10 The requirement that f ≥b>0 is because if otherwise, managers will have incentive to overstate all the time and 
truthfully report their peers as dishonest to get the high reward for blowing the whistle. 
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w=500 
ci: cA Є (cAmin, cAmax) Є (1000, 1050, … ,2000, … ,2950, 3000)?E(cA)=2000 
 cB Є (cBmin, cBmax)  Є (4000, 4050, … ,5000, … ,5950, 6000)?E(cB)=5000 B
                                                
ri:  ri = ci   if manager j reports manager i as dishonest;  
 cimax≥ ri ≥ci  if manager j reports manager i as honest  
E(ri - ci)=    0  if manager j reports manager i as dishonest;  
                   1000     if manager j reports manager i as honest11   
f:  1000  
b: 1000 
p: 2000 
The game can be solved by backward induction, resulting in a unique subgame perfect 
Nash Equilibrium in which each manager reports honestly both in stage-one and in stage-two. To 
see this, depending on what the two managers might have done in stage-one, they play one of 
four subgames in making their whistle blowing decisions in stage-two. For example, if manager 
A honestly reports his actual cost and manager B overstates in stage-one, the stage-two subgame 
is represented by the four bottom left cells in Table 1-Panel A. By looking at the payoffs in the 
cells, regardless of what B will do, A is always better off to tell the owner that B was dishonest 
(overstated). Regardless of what A will do, B is always better off to tell the owner that A 
honestly reported the cost.12 That is, the unique Nash Equilibrium for this subgame is for both A 
and B to truthfully tell the owner what the other party actually did in stage-one.  
 
11 A wealth maximizing manager should always overstate to cimax  if the other manager does not report on him. In 
such a situation, E (rA – cA) = cAmax -E (cA) =3000-2000=1000; E(rB – cB)= cBmax -E(cB)=6000-5000=1000 
12 In the case when B tells the owner that A honestly reported the cost, if A blows the whistle on B, A will receive 
1500 (500 wage+ 1000 reward for whistle blow) and B will receive -500 (500 wage -1000 fine for overstating). If 
instead, A covers for B, A will receive 500 (wage) and B will receive 1500 (500wage + 1000 slack).  
    In the case when B falsely accuses A to have overstated the cost, if A blows the whistle on B, A will receive 500 
(500 wage - 1000 fine + 1000 reward), and B will receive -2500 (500 wage -1000 fine - 2000 for false accusation). 
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If in stage-one, manager B honestly reports his cost but manager A overstates, their stage-
two subgame will be represented by the four upper right cells in Table 1-Panel A. If both A and 
B honestly report their costs (overstate their costs) in stage-one, their stage-two subgames are 
represented by the four lower right cells (upper left cells) in the panel. The unique Nash 
Equilibrium for each subgame is for both managers to truthfully tell the owner what their peer 
actually did in stage-one (see the four highlighted cells in Table 1-Panel A).  
Knowing that the other manager will truthfully report on peers in stage-two, through 
backward induction, each manager's dominant strategy in stage-one is to honestly report their 
costs.13 Therefore, based on the wealth maximizing assumption, the unique subgame perfect 
Nash Equilibrium for this two-stage game is for both managers to honestly report their own cost 
in stage-one, and truthfully report to the owner in stage-two that the other manager was honest in 
stage-one. No whistle blowing or audit will have to take place. The control system thereby 
allows the owner to achieve the first-best outcome. 
It is important to point out that under the wealth maximizing assumption, the above 
predictions should hold as long as the owner pays the managers their reservation utility payment 
(as long as the managers’ individual rationality constraint is satisfied). Whether the managers 
perceive their wage and the owner to be fair or unfair is irrelevant to their decisions, and in turn, 
irrelevant to the functioning of this peer reporting system. 
                                                                                                                                                             
If A covers for B, A will receive -500 (500 wage - 1000 fine), B will receive -500 (500 wage +1000 slack -2000 for 
false accusation).  
Therefore, in this subgame, no matter what B will do, A is better off to blow the whistle on B. No matter what A 
will do, B is better off not to falsely accuse A, that is, to tell the owner that A was honest in stage one. 
13 Through backward induction, the stage-one game is to choose among the four stage-two subgame equilibria (the 
four highlighted cells in Table 1-Panel A). Regardless of what the other manager might do in stage-one, a manager 
is always better off to honestly report his cost in stage-one. The unique Nash equilibrium for this stage-one game is 
for each manager to honestly report his cost. 
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To summarize, the prediction according to the wealth maximizing assumption is as 
follows: 
Wealth Maximizing Prediction 1: When managers can not communicate with each 
other under the peer reporting system, they always will honestly report their own cost in stage-
one, and truthfully inform the owner in stage-two that the other manager was honest in stage-
one, regardless of the managers’ fairness perception of the wage they receive from the owner.  
3.3 RELAX THE NO-COMMUNICATION ASSUMPTION 
In the previous arguments, managers are assumed to make their decisions independently 
without interacting with each other.14 In business practice, employees constantly interact with 
each other and this interaction may allow them to explicitly form collusive side agreements, to 
both lie and then cover for each other to achieve economic benefits. Under the peer reporting 
system in this study, there exists a collusive outcome (both managers lie to the owner in stage-
one and cover for each other in stage-two) that is beneficial for the managers. If managers have a 
chance to communicate with each other before they make any decisions, they may decide to 
collude against the owner.15 This poses a potential threat to the functioning of the peer reporting 
system. Therefore, a natural next step is to relax this no-communication assumption and see how 
the system will be affected. 
                                                 
14 This is an assumption in peer reporting monitoring models proposed by Demski and Sappington 1984, Demski et 
al. 1988, Ma 1988, Ma et al. 1988, Fischer and Hughes 1997, and Arya et al. 1996. 
15 In this study, as we can see from Table 1-Panel A, if the managers collude, they can receive their wage plus the 
slack they build into the cost report. If they choose to be honest to the owner, they can only receive their wage. This 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal for them, but harms the owner. 
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In game theory, any costless, non-binding, pre-play communication is labeled as “cheap 
talk”. According to conventional economic theory, even if managers can communicate with each 
other, the peer reporting system should still be collusion proof as long as the communication 
between managers is non-binding. This is because as in a typical Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
(PDG), although the collusive outcome is the best joint outcome for the managers, it is not a 
Nash Equilibrium. Even if the managers formed a nonbinding agreement where both would 
overstate and cover for each other, both managers have incentives to defect from the collusive 
agreement no matter whether the other person keeps the collusive agreement or not.16
For collusion to occur, the collusive agreement between managers must be self-enforcing, 
i.e., neither manager has an incentive to break the collusive agreement given that the other 
manager does not (Baiman, Evans and Nagarajan 1991). If enforceable agreements are not 
feasible, then even if rational players had agreed on a collusive strategy, they would not 
rationally expect each other to respect this agreement. Thus, no such agreement should occur in 
equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) and non-binding communication between managers 
should not undermine the effectiveness of the peer reporting system. The wealth maximizing 
prediction for the game when managers can communicate is for both managers to honestly report 
their own cost in stage-one, and truthfully report to the owner in stage-two that the other 
manager was honest in stage-one. No whistle blow or audit will have to take place.  
In addition, as in the no communication situation, according to the wealth maximizing 
assumption, the above predictions should hold as long as the owner pays managers their 
                                                 
16 As shown in the four upper left cells in Table 1-Panal A, if B breaks the agreement and blows the whistle on A, A 
is better off to blow the whistle on B since receiving 500 (500 wage-1000 fine for overstating +1000 reward for 
whistle blow) is better than receiving -500 (500 wage-1000 fine); if B keeps the agreement and covers for A, A is 
still better off to blow the whistle on B since 2500 (500 wage+1000 slack + 1000 reward for whistle blow) is better 
than 1500 (500 wage +1000 slack). The same strategy applies to B. 
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reservation utility payment. Whether managers perceive the wage and the owner to be fair or 
unfair is irrelevant to this game. 
Wealth Maximizing Prediction 2: When managers can communicate with each other 
under the peer reporting system, they always will honestly report their own cost in stage-one, and 
truthfully inform the owner in stage-two that the other manager was honest in stage-one, 
regardless of the managers’ fairness perception of the wage they receive from the owner. 
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CHAPTER 4: BEHAVIORAL THEORIES 
All incentive systems operate in some social context. The peer reporting system analyzed 
in the preceding chapter is collusion proof in inducing honesty in managerial reporting, either 
with or without manager communication.  The conclusions heavily depend on the assumption 
that managers are wealth maximizers and they are always willing to turn in their lying peers 
given the financial reward for whistle blowing. However, evidence from the whistle blowing 
literature shows that this is not always the case. The analytical model of the previous chapter 
treats whistle blowing on lying peers as given and does not probe into the processes through 
which such actions are more or less likely to take place. Behavioral research, on the other hand, 
provides theories for predicting when whistle blowing may or may not be expected to occur. In 
this chapter, I present evidence from the whistle blowing literature indicating that individuals are 
often reluctant to blow the whistle on others despite the financial reward for doing so. I also 
show evidence from research in whistle blowing, social psychology, accounting and 
experimental economics suggesting that agents' fairness perceptions of the principal can affect 
agents' inclination to report peer' misconduct to the principal. I then introduce the experimental 
cheap talk literature illustrating how agent communication and the credibility of such 
communication can affect cooperation (collusion) between agents. Finally, I argue that fairness 
norm can have a powerful influence on agents' behaviors either with or without communication. 
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4.1 SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE WHISTLE BLOWING LITERATURE 
An agent's private information concealed from the principal may be observed or even 
shared by the agent's co-workers. A survey of 725 executives and managers by Keenan (1988, 
2000) indicates that 65% of the managers have personally observed or obtained direct evidence 
of one or more types of fraud, waste, overstatement of cost or mismanagement within their 
companies. Another survey by the Institute of Management and Administration (IMA) in 1998 
reports that 45% of their respondents have observed other subordinates lying to their superiors 
(Darley, Messick and Tyler, 2001). However, noticing opportunistic behaviors does not mean 
that they are always confronted. According to the above IMA survey, slightly more than 70% of 
respondents fail to report an observed wrongdoing to another individual or group.  Keenan 
(1988, 2000) reports that about 50% of the managers who observe misbehaviors do not report 
them to higher management.  
The whistle blowing literature suggests that it is often socially and psychologically costly 
to blow the whistle on others. Any whistle blowing may require psychological, emotional, 
physical, and time investment (Newell and Stutman 1991). All the social/psychological costs of 
whistle blowing on peers may reduce an agent’s inclination to report a peer’s misconduct 
(Trevino and Victor 1992).  Thus, it takes more than financial rewards to motivate agents to 
report observed misconducts to the principal. 
The whistle blowing literature indicates that a situational factor that is important to an 
agent’s inclination to blow the whistle is the agent’s perception of the principal. Jones, James & 
Brunni (1975) find that agents who trust the principal exhibit more upward communication on 
problems than do other agents. Greater supervisory trust is associated with more use of the chain 
of command as an internal whistle blowing channel. Blackburn (1988) and Graham (1986) 
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propose that more supervisory support leads to more whistle blowing. Blackburn (1988) finds 
that agents with unexpressed concerns believe that their principal is less supportive of their 
concerns than do agents who voice concerns. Further, inactive observers also believe that they 
have less positive relationships with the principal than do other agents. Blackburn (1988) finds 
that silence is associated with a negative perception of the principal. These results provide 
preliminary evidence that an agent's perception regarding the principal is important in the whistle 
blowing decision process. 
According to Rennie and Crosby (2002), the thinking process of a person’s whistle 
blowing decision involves three steps—first, recognition of the wrongdoing, second, assessment 
of the wrongdoing and third, judgment of responsibility.  In step one, people apply their 
standards of what constitutes wrongdoing against their perceptions of what has taken place. In 
step two, people consider whether the wrongdoing deserves any action, that is, whether it is 
intolerable. In step three, people consider whether it is their responsibility to blow the whistle. If 
any of these questions are answered negatively, silence follows and the thinking process 
terminates. This process further suggests that a positive perception of the principal is important 
in triggering an agent’s decision to blow the whistle on organizational misconducts for three 
reasons. First, an agent’s standards of what constitutes organizational wrongdoings are more 
aligned with the standards of a principal for whom the agent has a positive opinion. Second, an 
agent who views the principal and the organization as a whole positively is less tolerant of the 
wrongdoing that can potentially harm the organization. Third, an agent who views the principal 
positively identifies more with the organization and is more likely to feel that it is his/her 
responsibility to help address problems within the organization. Thus, an agent who views the 
principal positively is more likely to blow the whistle to the principal. 
 38 
4.2 AGENTS' FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL 
The above mentioned findings from the whistle blowing literature indicate that an agent's 
perception of the principal should be taken into account when studying peer reporting. These 
findings echo those from experimental economics, social psychology and accounting which 
suggest that agents' behaviors in agency relationships are heavily influenced by their perceptions 
of the principal. This research also indicates that agent's perceptions of the principal are 
significantly affected by agent's perceived fairness of the principal; and agents often judge a 
principal's fairness by judging how fairly they are compensated by the principal. In Gift 
Exchange Games (e.g., Fehr et al. 1993; Fehr et al. 2002) agents are found to take into account 
the way principals behave and perform systematic comparisons of payoffs. Agents' concerns for 
the principal’s distributive fairness result in agents’ reciprocating behaviors-costly reward of the 
principal’s fair behavior and costly punishment of the principal’s unfair behavior. Research in 
experimental economics shows that in sequential response games, responders probe a proposer’s 
intention by judging how equitable the proposed payoff allocation is. The responders penalize 
the proposer if the proposer makes a deliberately selfish move, and reward the proposer if the 
proposer’s intention is viewed as neutral (Falk et al. 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002). Prior 
surveys and field studies have found that increased wages are associated with increased 
productivity (Raff and Summers 1987), and with lower levels of supervision (Osterman 1994). In 
accounting, Moser, Evans and Kim (1995, 2005) find that in a tax reporting setting, exchange 
inequity effects induce taxpayers to report less income to the government when the tax rate 
increases, thereby offsetting the economic forces that provide incentive for individuals to report 
more income. Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) indicate that managers report less 
honestly when the contract leads to an inequitable payoff distribution between the owner and the 
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managers. Hannan (2005) finds that workers provide more effort when they are paid higher 
wages by the owners. 
The above studies suggest that feelings of equity motivate agents to directly reciprocate 
by working hard or giving up personal gains in their bilateral interaction with the principal.  
Other studies indicate that feelings of equity also lead agents to identify with an organization’s 
goal, take pride in their work, and exhibit loyalty to the organization (Simon 1991). Agent 
loyalty is important since it inspires agents to obey authority, internalize duties and 
responsibilities commensurate with their position and make decisions that are in the best interest 
of the organization. As a result, loyal agents are more intolerant of unethical behaviors such as 
embezzlement and theft conducted by other agents, and they are more likely to go out of their 
ways to help the organization address these problems. In contrast, agents who feel that they are 
underpaid by the employers often view embezzlement and theft not as inappropriate but as a 
morally justified addition to wages and as an entitlement due from exploiting principals (Mars 
1974). Instead of stopping others from conducting these acts against the organization, agents 
who feel exploited by the organization are more likely to participate in these acts as a mechanism 
to correct perceptions of inequity or injustice (Hollinger and Clark 1983). 
The argument that feelings of equity can lead agents to go out of their ways to help the 
organization address problems is further supported by the third-party-reciprocity (indirect 
reciprocity) literature.  Studies by Seinen and Schram (2001) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) 
show that when one party to an exchange relationship violates an implicit norm, thereby 
“hurting” the exchange partner, a third party who knows of the violation may intervene. The 
third party may enforce exchange norms and sanction the party that violates the norm, even 
though doing so is costly, and even though the norm violation does not negatively affect the third 
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party’s economic payoff. However, the motivation for indirect reciprocity is heavily related to 
distributive norms and fairness judgments. The more negative the fairness judgments are towards 
the norm violators, the more likely the third party is to punish the violator (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004).  Fehr and Fischbacher conduct a third party punishment game with three players. The 
game between player A and player B is just a dictator game. Player A receives an endowment of 
100 tokens of which he can transfer any amount to player B, the recipient. Player B has no 
endowment and no choice to make. Player C has an endowment of 50 tokens and observes the 
transfer of player A. After this, player C can assign punishment points to player A. Each 
punishment point assigned to player A costs player C 1 token and costs player A 3 tokens. Since 
punishment is costly, a self-interested player C will never punish. However, the experimental 
results show that player As are never punished if they transferred 50 or more tokens to player B. 
If player A transfers less than 50 tokens, the punishment is the stronger the less player A 
transfers. Players Cs are willing to punish a selfish player A to enforce a fair sharing norm, and 
the more player A violates the norm, the more player Cs are willing to sacrifice themselves to 
punish A.  
Seinen and Schram (2000) study a repeated helping game with random pairing in large 
groups. Individuals in their experiment are divided between donors and recipients. Donors decide 
whether to help the individuals they are matched with at a certain cost. The cost the donors have 
to incur in order to help the recipients is smaller than the benefit the recipients will receive. They 
find that many donors decide whether they will incur a cost to help the recipients based on the 
information they receive about the recipients’ previous behaviors towards other people.  The 
donors are more willing to help the recipients whose behavior towards other people complies 
with a contribution norm. 
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The above third-party reciprocity studies suggest that when an agent embezzles from the 
principal (or performs other similar acts), another agent (the third party) who witnesses this 
behavior may be willing to sanction the embezzler to help the principal, even though helping the 
principal is costly, and that the embezzler's behavior does not negatively affect the third party’s 
own economic well-being. This willingness to help depends on the third party’s fairness 
perception of the principal. The third party is more likely to sanction the embezzler to help the 
principal if he/she feels that the principal is following a fairness norm when treating the agents. 
4.3 NON-BINDING AGENT COMMUNICATION 
This dissertation also explores the effect of non-binding agent communication on the peer 
reporting system. Nikias (2002) and Towry (2003) suggest that agent communication is the key 
to coordination between agents and coordination between agents affects agents’ off-equilibrium 
collusion under the peer reporting system. In addition, studying both agent communication and 
their perceived fairness of the principal allows me to explore how these two factors together 
affect agents' behaviors. Specifically, when agents have the opportunity to communicate 
(collude) with each other, will their communication and their subsequent behaviors be affected 
by their perceived fairness of the principal? On the other hand, when agents cannot communicate 
with each other, will agents' behaviors be affected by their fairness perception of the principal 
and their anticipation of other agents' fairness perception of the principal? This section reviews 
prior experimental literature on the role of non-binding communication (cheap talk) and presents 
theories and evidence to explore the potential influence of fairness norm on non-binding 
communication between agents. 
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4.3.1 Evidence from the Experimental Cheap Talk Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 3, according to conventional economic theory, agent 
communication has no value as long as such communication is non-binding. However, recent 
evidence from the experimental cheap talk literature suggests that messages sent by other 
players, although non-binding, may nonetheless influence actual play by affecting the beliefs that 
players hold about their partners and their potential actions. When cheap talk is allowed and the 
talk is perceived as credible in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games (Hereafter PDG), players frequently 
take advantage of pre-play communication and choose a Pareto optimal, dominated strategy that 
would otherwise be foregone without the cheap talk (Radlow and Weidner 1967; Dawes 1980; 
Dawes and Thaler 1988; Dawes et al. 1977; Farrell and Rabin 1996; Crawford 1998; Miller, 
Butts and Rode 2002).  
For example, Miller et al. (2002) suggests that agents often base their behavior on the 
signals they receive from others and also recognize the importance of the signals they send. 
Miller et al. (2002) use an adaptive computation model of endogenous agent communication to 
study cooperation in a series of one-shot PDGs. The agents in their model are randomly paired 
with each other in each game. Their results show that communication allows the emergence of 
cooperation. Cooperation is most likely to emerge when both agents communicate. If one agent 
communicates and the other says nothing, the game usually ends up in mutual defection. Dawes, 
McTavish and Shaklee (1977) conduct a series of PDG and find 72% cooperation in their non-
binding communicating group as opposed to an average of 31% in their no-communication 
groups. Radlow and Weidner (1967) compare the cooperation rate in the Partially Cooperative 
PDGs (players in these PDGs are allowed to make unenforceable commitments about future 
actions) with that of the Non-Cooperative PDGs (players in these PDGs made no initial 
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statement of their future actions). Their experiments last for 98 trials. They find that overall, 90% 
of all the choices made by the Partially Cooperative group are cooperative, while this is true of 
55% of the Non-Cooperative control group. Their findings indicate that first, even without player 
communication, the cooperation rate in the PDG is much higher than predicted by the game 
theory; and second, communications with unenforceable commitments result in substantially 
more cooperative play than when no communication is permitted, and they provide almost as 
much security as negotiations with enforceable commitments. In short, as pointed out by Dawes 
(1980), the salutary effects of communication on cooperation are ubiquitous. 
Since agents under the peer reporting system are essentially playing a PDG with each 
other, the above mentioned findings suggest that when agents are allowed to engage in non-
binding communication, they should cooperate more frequently than in the no-communication 
situation. That is, we should see more agents in the communication condition choosing the 
collusive outcome (cheating together and covering for each other), rendering the peer reporting 
system less effective. However, other research suggests that non-binding communication per se 
may not affect the players' cooperation rate in the PDG. Rather, it is the credible non-binding 
communication that matters. For example, Gahagan and Tedeschi (1969) compare participants' 
reactions to promises sent by their hypothetical partners in the PDG. These promises express the 
willingness to cooperate and have a 90%, a 60% or a 30% credibility level.  They find that 
participants send significantly more cooperative promises back, and cooperate significantly more 
often with their hypothetical partners on the next trial after they received the 90% credible 
promises. Their cooperating behaviors are not significantly different across the 60% and the 30% 
credibility levels. Their results suggest that a highly credible message produces different 
behavior in the recipients in a PDG than a message with a moderate or low credibility. Trust and 
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cooperation between players in the PDG is engendered not by communication of promises, but 
more specifically by the communication of credible promises. In addition, they suggest that in 
the PDG, participants normally see the non-binding promises as unbelievable unless the 
promises have a high level of credibility. In accounting, Kachelmeier et al. (1994) examine the 
effect of the firm's non-binding budgetary communication (threat) on the propensity of divisions 
to propose boondoggle projects. They find that the effect of the non-binding budgetary threat 
depends on the credibility of such a threat, in other words, whether the division believes the firm 
has the incentive to actually carry out such a threat. Specifically, budgetary threat has (has no) 
significant effect on the divisions' proposals when the threat is (is not) perceived as credible. 
These papers suggest that when studying the effect of non-binding communication on players' 
behaviors in non-cooperative games, it is important to consider factors that can affect the 
credibility of such communications. 
4.3.2 Fairness Norm and Non-Binding Communication 
The cheap talk studies discussed so far all deal with a simple environment where 
communication between players and the result of the game only affect the payoffs of the 
communicating players. In other words, in all the above games, neither players' communication 
on subsequent cooperating or defecting choices nor the outcome of the game has any impact on 
the payoff of a participant who is not part of the cheap talk exchange. If instead, communication 
between two players not only affects their own payoffs, but also that of a third party, it is 
reasonable to expect that the substance of the communication as well as the two players' 
subsequent choices can be affected by the third party's behavior and the two players' perception 
of the third party. For example, in the situation of agent collusion, where the mutual cooperation 
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(collusion) between agents is harmful to the principal, collusive cheap talk between agents can 
be affected by how the principal treats the agents. If the principal treats the agents fairly, the 
agents should be more reluctant to use their ability to communicate to collude against the 
principal for two reasons. First, according to the fairness and reciprocity literature introduced in 
section 4.2, the agents may wish to reciprocate a fair principal by being honest. Second, the 
agents may be afraid to hurt their social image by cheating a fair principal. Despite the fact that 
an agent might want to initiate a collusive offer, he might hesitate to do so, knowing that it 
violates social norms. Because there is a social norm against cheating a principal who is 
perceived to be fair, initiating a collusive offer is not considered to conform to the public 
standard of behavior. For this reason, one agent might hesitate to initiate a collusive offer to the 
other agent even if he personally would prefer to reap greater benefit from the principal by 
colluding.  
In addition, the perceived fairness of the principal can also influence how a collusive 
suggestion is received by the other agent. In other words, the perceived fairness of the principal 
can affect the credibility of the collusive message. When an agent sends a message suggesting 
colluding against a fair principal, this could undermine the sender’s credibility because merely 
making this suggestion violates social norms. Therefore, the receiver of the message may reject 
the collusive offer because he believes that an agent who announces the willingness to collude 
against a fair principal cannot be trusted not to renege on his announcement if there is an 
economic advantage to reneging. Another reason the receiver of the collusive offer may reject 
the offer is to repay a fair principal (i.e., out of positive reciprocity to the principal). 
In contrast, an agent should be more willing to ask the other agent to collude with him 
when the principal is perceived to be unfair. This can be driven by negative reciprocity (tit-for-tat 
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to an unfair boss), and by the fact that social norm is more ambiguous on what the agents should 
do to an unfair principal. Research from social psychology reveals that lying in self-defense 
against punishment is regarded as more permissible than lying for personal gain at the expense of 
others (Lindskold and Walters 1983). Initiating a collusive offer is more socially justifiable when 
the principal is unfair. 
On the other hand, if the principal is perceived to be unfair, an agent might be more 
willing to accept the other agent’s collusive offer to restore perceived fairness (i.e., out of 
negative reciprocity to the principal). In addition, the credibility of the collusive agent’s message 
should be higher in this situation because the offer is not only driven by pure self interest, but 
also could be driven by the more socially acceptable motive of getting even with an unfair party. 
 
4.3.3 A Note on Norm Anticipation 
Much evidence suggests that a social norm has powerful influence on people’s behaviors. 
Individuals have the preference for enforcing social norms and they anticipate that others have 
this preference too. In Gift Exchange games, the principals anticipate agents’ preference for 
fairness and offer wages that are much higher than the minimum (zero rent) wage. Roth et al. 
(1991) report the result of several ultimatum games and provide evidence that the offerors in the 
game make offers that are a best reply to their beliefs concerning the rejection behavior of 
receivers. Fehr, Fishchbacher and Gacher (2002) show that in the presence of punishment 
opportunities, the strong reciprocators can force the selfish-type players to cooperate. In 
accounting, Rankin et al. (2003) show that the subordinates in their experiment anticipate the 
superiors’ preference for honesty and their ability to reject projects. As a result, they only 
 47 
overstate costs by an average of 58%. Rankin et al. (2005) provide evidence consistent with the 
idea that the subordinates in their study anticipate the superiors’ increased ability to reject high 
cost report to enforce fairness norms in the high span condition and lower the level of slack built 
into their budget reports accordingly. In social psychology, Lindbeck (1997) suggest that there is 
a disutility associated with deviation from the actual behavior of others or even the expected 
behavior of others’. Rege & Telle (2004) show that simply the suspicion that others disapprove 
of one’s behavior when acting against the social norm can carry significant non-monetary costs, 
such as internalized feelings of guilt or loss of self respect.  As a result, people act in accordance 
with social norms. All the above research indicates that anticipations of others’ preference for 
enforcing social norms can have powerful effect on individuals’ choices. It is important to 
emphasize here that in all the above studies, communication among participants is not a 
prerequisite for norm anticipation. Participants in the above studies did not communicate with 
each other. Nevertheless, they anticipated that others have the preference for norm enforcement 
and acted accordingly. 
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CHAPTER 5: BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
This chapter develops specific hypotheses on the relationships between fairness, 
communication and managers’ behaviors under the peer reporting system in the participative 
budgeting setting of this dissertation. The hypotheses are based on theories and evidence 
discussed in the preceding chapter. I first consider how managers’ perceived fairness of the 
owner might affect the peer reporting system in the simple case where managers cannot 
communicate with each other. Later, I investigate when managers can communicate with each 
other, how their perceived fairness of the owner and their ability to communicate with each other 
work together to affect the peer reporting system. 
5.1 WITHOUT MANAGER COMMUNICATION 
The fairness and third party reciprocity literature presented in the preceding chapter 
indicates that in the context of this dissertation, when a manager reduces the owner’s monetary 
payoff by overstating his own production cost, another manager who witnesses this 
overstatement may be willing to sanction this behavior. However, such willingness depends on 
the manager’s perception of the fairness of the owner. In the current experiment, before 
managers make any decisions, the owner makes the first move by offering a wage to the 
managers. When the owner is perceived as unfair by offering managers an unfair wage, the 
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owner, rather than the manager who overstates cost, may be considered as the party who first 
violates the fairness norm. As a result, the manager who observes the overstatement may punish 
the owner by covering for the overstating manager rather than punishing the overstating manager 
by blowing the whistle. 
On the other hand, when the owner is perceived as fair by offering a fair wage, the 
overstating manager is more likely to be considered as the party who first violates the fairness 
norm. In this case, the overstating behavior by the manager may be seen more as an act of greed, 
rather than “getting even”. In addition, social identity research indicates that employees usually 
identify more with the organization when the perceived fairness is high, and people are more 
likely to cooperate with or contribute more to the group with which they identify (Brewer and 
Kramer 1986; Wit and Wile 1992, Towry 2003). This reasoning suggests that the manager 
should be more willing to report on his overstating peer when the owner offers a fair wage.  
As discussed in section 4.3.3, individuals have the preference for enforcing social norms 
and they anticipate that others have this preference too. Even without communication, the 
managers are expected to be able to anticipate that fellow managers are more (less) willing to 
blow the whistle when the owner is perceived to be fair (unfair). As a result, the deterrent effect 
of the peer reporting system should be stronger when the owner is perceived to be fair and a 
manager who receives a fair wage from the owner should be more deterred from overstating his 
cost. In addition, prior research suggests that managers are also more willing to be honest or 
work hard when the owner is perceived as fair (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser 2001, 
Hannan 2005). All the above arguments lead to my first two hypotheses: 
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Behavioral Hypothesis H1a: Ceteris paribus, when managers are NOT allowed to communicate 
under the peer reporting system, they report their costs more honestly when they receive the fair 
wage from the owner than when they receive the unfair wage.  
 
Behavioral Hypothesis H1b: Ceteris paribus, when managers are NOT allowed to communicate 
under the peer reporting system, the percentage of whistle blowing on lying peers is higher when 
they receive the fair wage from the owner than when they receive the unfair wage.  
5.2 WITH MANAGER COMMUNICATION 
The previous chapter argues that when a third party’s benefit is involved, the 
communication between two players will be affected by the two players’ fairness perceptions of 
the third party. In the setting of this dissertation, when the managers can communicate with each 
other, they may negotiate a collusive strategy that benefits them at the expense of the owner. 
Hence, whether the managers will utilize their communication opportunity to collude against the 
owner depends on the managers’ fairness perceptions of the owner, specifically, whether the 
managers believe the owner pays them fairly.  
If the owner is perceived as fair by offering the managers a fair wage, the managers 
should be more reluctant to use the communication opportunity to send any collusive message 
for two reasons. First, they may not want to collude out of positive reciprocity towards the 
owner. Second, they may not want to collude out of reluctance to violate the fairness norm. In 
addition, the perceived fairness of the owner will influence how a suggestion of colluding is 
received by the managers. This is because first, the receiver of the collusive suggestion is likely 
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to reject the offer in order to reciprocate to a fair owner; second, the receiver may reject the offer 
because a suggestion to collude against a fair owner sounds less credible. In contrast, if the 
owner is perceived as unfair by offering the managers an unfair wage, the above inhibitions 
against collusion will be diminished. As a result, the managers will be more likely to utilize their 
ability to communicate to collude against an unfair owner than a fair owner. 
To summarize, when the managers can engage in non-binding communication, their 
fairness perception of the owner can affect their willingness to collude and the credibility of any 
collusive communication. In turn, the managers' fairness perception will affect the frequency of 
managers agreeing to both overstate their costs and cover for each other. Therefore, when the 
managers can communicate with each other under the peer reporting system, both their reporting 
honesty and their whistle blowing percentage are also affected by their fairness perception of the 
owner based on the wage. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
 Behavioral Hypothesis H2a: Ceteris paribus, when the managers are allowed to 
communicate under the peer reporting system, they report their costs more honestly when they 
receive the fair wage from the owner than when they receive the unfair wage.  
 
 Behavioral Hypothesis H2b: Ceteris paribus, when the managers are allowed to 
communicate under the peer reporting system, their percentage of whistle blowing on lying peers 
is higher when they receive the fair wage from the owner than when they receive the unfair 
wage.  
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 Behavioral Hypothesis H2c: Ceteris paribus, when the managers are allowed to 
communicate under the peer reporting system, they send more collusive messages to each other 
when they receive the unfair wage from the owner than when they receive the fair wage.  
 
 Behavioral Hypothesis H2d: Ceteris paribus, when the managers are allowed to 
communicate under the peer reporting system, they form more collusive agreements with each 
other when they receive the unfair wage from the owner than when they receive the fair wage.  
5.3 COMMUNICATION VERSUS NO COMMUNICATION 
In comparison with the no-communication condition, the managers’ ability to 
communicate with each other is expected to lead to more collusion and less honesty in reporting 
when the managers receive the unfair wage from the owner, but not when they receive the fair 
wage. I elaborate on these next. 
When the owner is perceived as unfair by offering an unfair wage, collusive 
communication can reinforce the managers' perception of the owner's unfairness, trigger their 
collusive intention and allow them to explicitly coordinate on a collusive strategy. Studies in 
organizational behavior have demonstrated the impact of social information processing on job 
attitudes. For example, Dean and Brass (1985) find that coworkers show greater congruence in 
perceptions as their social interactions with each other increase. Folger and Kass (2000) suggest 
that coworkers’ perceptions can be used as diagnostic information and that discussing work 
experiences with coworkers can also mutually reinforce and alter justice perceptions among 
coworkers. Lind et al. (1998) find that when study participants are allowed to communicate and 
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discover that they have shared mutual injustices, fairness ratings plummet. A person who is 
surrounded by coworkers who complain that they are treated unjustly is primed to interpret the 
supervisor’s ambiguous behavior as unfair (Lind et al. 1998).  This shared perception of 
unfairness will lead to a higher level of collusion between the parties who communicate, in this 
dissertation, this means that the managers will overstate their costs and cover for each other to a 
higher degree. 
 
Behavioral Hypothesis H3a: When the managers receive the unfair wage from the 
owner, the managers report their costs less honestly when the managers can communicate with 
each other than when they cannot. 
 
Behavioral Hypothesis H3b: When the managers receive the unfair wage from the 
owner, the managers’ percentage of whistle blowing on lying peers is lower when the managers 
can communicate with each other than when they cannot. 
 
In contrast, when the owner is perceived as fair by offering a fair wage, it is not clear 
whether managers’ communication will lead to more or less honesty. On one hand, experimental 
cheap talk literature suggests that communication provides the managers a better chance to 
cooperate (collude), thereby decreasing their reporting honesty. However, as stated before, when 
the owner is perceived as fair, the credibility of a collusive offer is reduced, and the non-binding 
agreement against the fair owner is less likely to succeed. In fact, communication may even lead 
to a higher level of reporting honesty, because the managers may communicate to reinforce the 
feeling of positive reciprocity towards the owner (Folger and Kass 2000). Similar arguments 
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apply to the managers' willingness to blow the whistle on a lying peer. This leads to the next two 
research questions. 
 
Research Question 1: When the managers receive the fair wage from the owner, do 
managers report their cost less honestly when they can communicate with each other than when 
they cannot? 
 
Research Question 2: When the managers receive the fair wage from the owner, is the 
percentage of whistle blowing on lying peers lower when the managers can communicate with 
each other than when they cannot? 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHOD 
The hypotheses and research questions described in Chapter 5 are tested using an 
experiment. The experiment uses a 2x2x8 (Agent Communication x Wage x Experimental 
Period) design. Agent communication (yes or no), is manipulated between-subjects by assigning 
participants to one of the two communication conditions. Wage (fair or unfair) is measured by 
asking owners to choose either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras as wage for the managers and ask 
managers to rate their perceived fairness of the owners based on the wage. Experimental period 
(8 levels), is manipulated within-subjects. Section 6.1 illustrates the experimental scenario and 
the managers' expected payoffs in the experiment. Section 6.2 describes participants and 
procedures used in each communication conditions. Section 6.3 discusses the owner participants' 
role in the experiment.  
6.1 SCENARIO AND THE MANAGERS' EXPECTED PAYOFFS 
The scenario used in both communication conditions is as follows: A firm sells 1000 
units of product A at 3 Liras per unit and 1000 units of product B at 6 Liras per unit. Actual unit 
costs for product A falls within the range of (1.00, 1.05, 1.10…3.00) Liras, and the costs for 
product B falls within (4.00, 4.05, 4.10…6.00) Liras. The owner of the firm hires two divisional 
managers, A and B. The two managers are responsible for producing 1000 units of product A 
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and 1000 units of product B, respectively, and reporting their production cost to the owner. The 
managers are each paid a wage. The level of the wage (either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras) is decided 
by the owner.  
Both managers know their own division’s actual cost and the other manager’s actual cost. 
The owner, however, only knows the probability distribution of the possible production costs. To 
control for potentially opportunistic reporting, the firm establishes an internal control system 
which encourages peer reporting (whistle blowing). Specifically, the system requires each 
manager to indicate whether his peer has overstated the cost after both managers independently 
report their own costs. If there is no accusation of overstating, the resource provided to the 
division equals the cost reported by the divisional manager. If the manager of any division is 
accused of overstating, the manager being accused is fined 1000 Liras. An audit will then take 
place and the resource provided to the division equals the division’s actual cost. The accusing 
manager receives a 1000 Lira reward if the result of the audit confirms the accusation, but the 
accusing manager is fined 2000 Liras if the audit reveals that the accusation is false. The peer 
reporting system employed in this study loosely follows Ma (1988)’s design.17 Although it may 
seem inappropriate to punish a manager solely based on the accusation of another manager, the 
reward structure makes it highly unlikely that any manager will falsely accuse another manager 
since the penalty for such false accusation outweighs any potential benefit. 
In this study, the manager's wage (w) is set by the owner at either 500 Liras or 1000 
Liras. The expected slack each manager can consume, E(ri - ci), is 1000 Liras if the manager's 
                                                 
17 The peer reporting system used in this dissertation is the same as the vertical system in Towry (2003).  Towry 
used Ma’s (1988) model. However, she modified Ma’s (1988) model in two ways. First, Ma’s (1988) model is 
asymmetric, i.e., agent A’s task is to report both agents' actions and agent B’s task is to verify agent A's reports. 
Towry (2003) took the spirit of that model and operationalized it with a symmetric model, i.e., both agents report 
their own actions and verify each other’s report. This was a logical extension of the model. Second, instead of using 
a lottery, Towry (2003) employed a costless auditor. While the lottery and the auditor have the same effect, the latter 
is both easier to understand and to operationalize in an experimental setting. 
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overstatement is not detected, and 0 if the overstatement is detected.18 The fine for overstating (f) 
and the bonus for truthful accusation (b) are both 1000 Liras. The penalty for false accusation (p) 
is 2000 Liras. The managers' expected payoffs under each reporting and whistle blowing strategy 
combinations are displayed in Table 1. Panel A presents the managers' expected payoffs when 
the owner pays them a 500-Lira wage; Panel B presents the managers' expected payoffs when the 
owner pays them a 1000-Lira wage.19 As analyzed in chapter 3, the unique subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium for the game under the 500 Lira wage level would be that both managers 
honestly report their costs to the owner and then tell the owner that their peer reported honestly. 
In equilibrium, the managers should both receive their 500-Lira wage. The same logic applies to 
the game under the 1000 Lira wage level--the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the 
game would be that both managers honestly report their costs and then tell the owner that their 
peer reported honestly. Both managers receive their 1000-Lira wage in equilibrium. 
6.2 PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURES 
Sixty undergraduate students who were taking evening business classes participated in 
the experiment. The participants had an average age of 22.3 and an average of 2.67 years of work 
                                                 
18 The actual unit cost for division A (B) distributes evenly from 1 to 3 Liras (from 4 to 6 Liras). The expected unit 
cost is 2 Liras for division A and 5 Liras for division B. Since each division produces 1000 units, the expected total 
actual cost is 2000 Liras for A and 5000 Liras for B. Therefore, the expected organizational slack manager A can 
consume by reporting his maximum possible cost, 3000 Liras, would be 1000 Liras (=3000-2000). Similarly, the 
expected slack manager B can consume by reporting her maximum possible cost, 6000 Liras, would also be 1000 
Liras (= 6000-5000).  
On the other hand, if a manager's overstating behavior is detected, the slack would be 0 Lira since an audit 
would take place and the resource transferred to the division would be equal to the actual production cost. 
 
19 Table 1 only shows payoffs calculated based on the expected actual costs. When actual costs are higher or lower 
then the expected costs, payoffs under some choice combinations can be higher or lower. However, the changes will 
not affect the result of the game. The unique Nash Equilibrium is still for both agents to honestly report their own 
costs in stage-one and to truthfully reveal their information about each other in stage-two. 
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experience. One third of the participants played the owner’s role, and two thirds the manager's 
role. Two experimental sessions were conducted for each of the two communication conditions, 
with at least four owners and eight managers in each session. In total, thirty-three students 
participated in the no communication condition (NCC) and twenty-seven in the communication 
condition (CC). The data from the two sessions in each communication conditions are pooled 
since there is no significant difference across sessions. 
In both communication conditions, the owner participants and the manager participants 
were given instructions separately. The experimenters read the instructions aloud and went 
through several numerical examples with the participants. Participants were encouraged to ask 
questions to make sure that they understood the procedures. Participants also read a consent 
form. In the consent form, they were told that their participation in this research study was 
completely voluntary and they could withdraw from the study at any time, should they change 
their mind. This procedure not only is required by the IRB, but also is a step to guarantee that the 
manager participants accept the 500-Lira wage as the compensation to keep them in the 
experiment. Therefore, the 500-Lira wage can be seen as the manager participants' reservation 
payment for participating.  After the instructions were explained, the managers were divided into 
two groups and were seated in rooms A and B.  The owners were already seated in room C.   
The experiment lasted for eight periods. In each period, a manager A was anonymously 
matched with a new manager B, and a new owner. No two managers ever were paired with each 
other more than twice and no triads were ever repeated. The participants in the same room were 
never paired with each other. The participants were not told who their partners were either during 
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or after the experiment. The experimenters announced at the beginning of every experimental 
period that their partners were changed in the new period.20  
At the conclusion of the eighth period, all participants completed a post experimental 
questionnaire. The participants' final pay was determined by the result of one of the eight 
periods, which was randomly chosen. For each 1000 Liras they earned in the experiment, they 
received $15. Their payment method was announced at the beginning of the experiment. 
Payment was made by an individual who is unfamiliar with the experiment to preserve the 
participants' anonymity. 
6.2.1 Timeline in NCC 
Figure 1 shows the timeline in each experimental period for both communication 
conditions. In NCC, at the beginning of each period, the owners were asked to choose either 500 
Liras or 1000 Liras as the wage for the two managers matched with him/her in that period. The 
two managers in each triad received the same wage and the experimenters made sure that both 
the owners and the managers knew this. In addition, both the owners and the managers were told 
that in the pilot study, the average wage chosen by the owners was 750 Liras.21  
                                                 
20 Participants were not repeatedly matched to avoid extraneous variables (such as reputation or tit-for tat behaviors) 
as explanations for the managers’ behaviors, as well as to better test Ma’s model. Ma’s model is for a one-shot 
game. If the participants were repeatedly matched with each other in the experiment, they would have been involved 
in a multi-period game as opposed to eight one-shot games.  
 
21 The pilot study was run in April 2005. The design and the results are briefly discussed in Chapter 7, footnote 24. 
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Next, the managers were informed of the wage chosen by the owner matched with them 
in that period.  The managers then learned the actual costs for both division A and division B and 
submitted the cost they wished to report for their own division.22
The experimenters collected the cost reports from each manager and informed the 
managers the cost reported by the manager with whom he/she was paired. The managers were 
then asked to circle one of two choices: “The other manager honestly reported his/her cost” or 
“The other manager overstated his/her cost." They were instructed that while they knew with 
certainty whether the other manager overstated the cost, they could choose to circle either 
response, regardless of what the other manager actually did. The experimenter then informed the 
corresponding owners both the managers' reported costs and the above choice they circled.  
If a manager indicated that the other manager paired with him/her overstated the cost, the 
accussee was audited and the payoffs were calculated. If a manager reported that his/her partner 
was honest, there was no audit and the payoffs were calculated based on the managers' reported 
costs. Each participant was informed of his/her payoff for the period. After this, the next period 
started.  
6.2.2 Timeline in CC 
As shown in Figure 1, the timeline in CC is very similar to that in NCC except the 
follows: 
                                                 
22 To save time in the experiment, actual unit production costs for each period were predetermined by randomly 
drawing from 41 equally likely choices (1.00, 1.05, 1.10…3.00) for Division A and from 41 equally likely choices 
(4.00, 4.05, 4.10 …6.00) for division B, with the exception of a few out-flyers (costs too close to the high or low end 
of the range) being thrown away. For any given period, the actual cost for all manager As are the same and the 
actual cost for all manager Bs are the same. The same set of costs was used in the two communication conditions. 
The drawn costs for both divisions were pre-printed on a pink paper and hidden under eight labels. The managers 
were told not to look ahead to the costs of subsequent periods.  
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After the managers learned their wage for the period, they could communicate twice with 
the other manager in writing. Specifically, in each period, the two managers who were paired 
with each other for that period simultaneously wrote a message to each other. The messages were 
placed in envelopes and exchanged through the experimenters. After the managers read the 
message sent to them, they simultaneously wrote a response. The responses were placed in 
envelopes and exchanged through the experimenters. The managers were told that they could 
write anything except for information that might reveal their personal identity. They were also 
told that writing was not obligatory. They did not have to write anything if they chose not to. 
After the managers received the response (the second message) from their paired 
managers, they learned the actual costs for the period and submitted their own cost report to the 
owner. The rest of the timeline was the same as in NCC.  
6.3 THE OWNERS IN THE EXPERIMENT 
6.3.1 The Owners' Expected Payoff 
In this experiment, the hypothetical firm sells 1000 units of product A at 3 Liras each and 
1000 units of product B at 6 Liras each. The sales revenue of division A (B) is 3000 Liras (6000 
Liras). The firm also has 2000 Liras other income.23 The owner is the residual claimant of the 
firm. The owner’s payoff in the study can be written as: 
                                                 
23 Adding 2000 Liras other income is to guarantee that the owners will never incur a loss by offering the 1000-Lira 
wage to the managers. Without the other income, if the owner chooses 1000 Liras as the wage level for the two 
managers, yet both managers lie to the maximum and cover for each other, the owner’s payoff will be -2000 (=0 
Gross Profit-2000 wage). Adding 2000 Liras other income is to make sure that the owners participants do not have 
to worry about incurring a loss by offering the 1000-Lira wage.  
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πA (3000-cA) + πB (6000-cB BB) +2000-W. 
Here, W is the firm's total wage expense, ci (i=A, B) is the actual production cost for 
division i, “3000-cA” and “6000-cB” is the actual Gross Margin for division A and division B, 
respectively.  “π
B
i” (i=A, B) is the owner's share of a division’s Gross Margin, which is 
determined by the two managers' reporting honesty and whistle blowing decisions. Specifically,  
πi =100%,    if Manager j (j=A, B; j≠i) blows the whistle 
 =Manager i’s reporting honesty,  if Manager j does not blow the whistle 
If Manager i is dishonest in reporting and Manager j blows the whistle, the resources 
transferred to division i will equal the actual cost, and the owner can receive 100% share of the 
actual Gross Margin (πi =100%). On the other hand, if Manager j does not blow the whistle, the 
owner’s share of the actual Gross Margin will be determined by Manager i’s reporting honesty. 
In the case when Manager i’s reporting honesty is 0%, i.e., Manager i overstates his cost to the 
maximum and appropriates the entire surplus of the division, the owner's share of division i’s 
Gross Margin will be 0% (πi=0%). Substituting the divisions’ actual costs with the expected 
costs (the expected cost for division A is 2000 Liras; the expected cost for division B is 5000 
Liras), the owner's expected profit (OEP) can be simplified as: 
1000 πA +1000 πB +2000-W 
Let π=(πA+ πB)/2, the owner’s expected profit can be further simplified as  B
OEP=2000 π+2000-W 
The owners in the study can offer either a 500-Lira or a 1000-Lira wage to each manager 
(total wage expense, W, equals 1000 Liras or 2000 Liras). Holding all else constant, a 500-Lira 
wage will always assure the owner a higher payoff (see Figure 2). As derived below, only if 
increasing the wage from 500-Lira to 1000-Lira can increase π by more than 50%, is the owner 
economically better off to offer the high wage: 
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To make the owner's expected profit at high wage (OEP1000) equal that at low wage 
(OEP500), we should have  
 2000* π1000 +2000-2*1000=2000*π500+ 2000-2*500 
 This means π1000=0.5+ π500
 Therefore, 
 If π1000 - π500=0.5, OEP1000=OEP500
 If π1000 - π500>0.5, OEP1000>OEP500
 If π1000 - π500<0.5, OEP1000<OEP500
6.3.2 A Note on Having Owner Participants in the Design 
Instead of using hypothetical owners, student participants played the role of the owners in 
this experiment and chose the wage for the managers. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages associated with this design. One potential disadvantage is that by asking real 
participants to choose the wage, there is a risk of having very uneven number of 500 Lira and 
1000 Lira wage choices. In the most extreme case, if the owner participants unanimously chose 
the 500 Lira wage, as predicted using the wealth maximizing assumption, the experiment would 
fail for the purpose of this dissertation. However, results from prior experimental studies (Fehr 
and Gachter, 2002; Hannan 2005) indicate that it is highly unlikely that the owner participants 
will always choose the minimum wage. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the owners 
may have concerns for reciprocity and fairness. Second, the owners may believe that the 
managers’ subsequent colluding and reporting decisions will be affected by their perceptions of 
the fairness of the wage. In this case, the owner may want to choose a fairer wage level in order 
to induce the managers to report more honestly and turn in their lying peers more often, thereby 
increasing the owner's share of the profit. 
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On the other hand, the advantage of having real owner participants choose the wage is 
that it can accentuate the managers’ feelings of reciprocity towards the owners. The managers' 
feeling of reciprocity towards the owners is vital to the managers’ subsequent decision makings 
and is therefore very important to this study. In addition, this design affords an opportunity to 
observe the owners’ behaviors under the peer reporting system in a controlled experiment. 
Therefore, in this experiment, student participants play the role of the owners and choose the 
wage for the manager participants. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the experiment and the analysis of the primary 
hypotheses. In addition, supplementary analyses on the owners’ wage choices and their payoffs 
in the experiment are provided. 24
 
 
                                                 
24 Before conducting the two experiments, a pilot study was run with 36 undergraduate students as participants, 
15 of them participated in the no communication condition, 21 participated in the communication condition. The 
design of the pilot study is slightly different from the experimental design discussed earlier. The major differences 
are as follows. First, in the pilot, the owners were asked to choose one of three wage levels (500, 750, and 1000) as 
apposed to two wage levels (500, 1000). Second, in the pilot, the manager participants in the communication 
condition were only allowed to communicate once as apposed to twice in each round. Third, in the pilot, the 
participants were paid $5 instead of $15 for each 1000 Liras they earned. Fourth, five instead of eight rounds were 
run in the pilot. 
In both communication conditions, the managers’ reporting honesty and whistle blowing percentage are 
very high when they perceived the wage offer as fair. Both their reporting honesty and their whistle blowing 
percentages are much lower when they perceived the wage as unfair. Additionally, in the communication condition, 
lower fairness perception also led to a higher percentage of collusive offers sent and a higher percentage of collusive 
agreements formed.  
 Comparing the no-communication condition with the communication condition, I found in the pilot that 
when the manager participants perceived the wage offer as fair, their reporting honesty and their whistle blowing 
percentages are not significantly different across the communication conditions. In contrast, when the wage offer 
was perceived as unfair, the managers' self reporting honesty level is significantly lower in the communication 
condition. The only result in the pilot study that is not consistent with the behavioral hypotheses is that I did not find 
any support for H3b. That is, the managers’ whistle blowing percentage is not lower in the communication 
condition. In other words, when the wage was perceived as unfair, the manager participants did not cover more for 
each other's overstating behavior when they could communicate with each other than when they could not. This 
result may be due to the fact that the manager participants in the pilot could only communicate simultaneously with 
each other once in each round, therefore they did not have the opportunity to reconfirm each other’s collusive 
intention. Thus, the communication condition reported in this dissertation adopted the new design where the 
manager participants could communicate with each other twice (send a message and make a response to their 
manager partner) in each period. In addition, in the experiment reported in this dissertation, more rounds were run 
and higher incentive was offered to the participants in order to test the robustness of the results found in the pilot. 
Moreover, instead of using three wage levels (500 Liras, 750 Liras and 1000 Liras), the owners in the experiment 
were asked to choose between two wage levels (500 Liras and 1000 Liras), and the participants were informed that 
in the pilot, the average wage chosen was 750 Liras. This is to ensure that both the owners and the managers in the 
experiment had a benchmark for judging the fairness of the wage. 
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7.1 MANIPULATION CHECKS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES 
Several manipulation check questions were asked to ensure that participants understood 
the scenarios and attended to the manipulations. Except for two managers from NCC, everyone 
answered all check questions correctly. The two managers' data is eliminated from the analyses.  
The major independent variables in this study are manager communication and the wage 
offered by the owners. Wage is determined by the owners, rather than the experimenter. The 
results of the owners' choices are as follows: in NCC, the owners send a total of 160 wage offers 
to the managers across the eight periods (20 managers X 8 periods), 92 of them (58%) are the 
500-Lira offers and 68 (42%) are the 1000-Lira offers. In CC, the owners send a total of 144 
wage offers to the managers across the eight periods (18 managers X 8 periods), 118 of them 
(82%) are the 500-Lira offers and 26 (18%) are the 1000-Lira offers. In the post experimental 
questionnaire, a validity check on whether wage corresponds to managers' fairness perception of 
the owner was performed. The managers were asked to rate their perceived fairness of the owner 
based on the wage on a 1-7 point scale (with 1 being the most unfair, 4 being neither fair nor 
unfair, and 7 the most fair). Results show that receiving the 500-Lira (1000-Lira) wage highly 
corresponds to managers' perception of having an unfair (a fair) owner. In NCC, the mean 
fairness rating for the owner when he/she offers the 500-Lira wage is 2.3 and the rating is 6.3 
when the owner offers the 1000-Lira wage (t=12.92, p<0.001). In CC, the mean fairness rating 
for the owner when he/she offers the 500-Lira wage is 2.2 and the rating is 5.7 when the owner 
offers the 1000-Lira (t=8.96, p<0.001).  As a result, wage, as an indicator of the managers' 
fairness perception of the owner, is used as the major independent variable in the analyses. In 
this dissertation, the terms 500-Lira wage and unfair wage are used exchangeably; the terms 
1000-Lira wage and fair wage are used exchangeably. 
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The major dependent variables of this study are the managers' reporting honesty, and the 
percentage of whistle blowing. A manager's reporting honesty refers to his honesty in reporting 
his/her own division's cost to the owner. Following Evans et al. (2001), reporting honesty is 
measured as "1- Slack Claimed/Slack Available".25 Similar to Towry (2003), the percentage of 
whistle blowing is defined as the percentage of truthful whistle blowing on lying peers.26
7.2 HYPOTHESES TESTING 
7.2.1 Overview of Results 
 Table 2-Panel A summarizes wealth maximizing predictions for this experiment. First of 
all, anticipating that the peer reporting system can ensure truthful reporting regardless of the 
wage level, wealth maximizing owners should always offer the 500-Lira wage to the managers. 
Second, regardless of the communication condition they are in, and regardless of the wage they 
receive from the owner, wealth maximizing managers should always report their cost honestly 
under the peer reporting system. There should be no cost overstatement in any situation. In turn, 
there should be no chance for whistle blowing.  
Table 2-Panel B reports the major results of the experiment. The results differ from the 
wealth maximizing predictions. As mentioned earlier, in both communication conditions, the 
owners do not always choose the 500-Lira wage. When the managers receive the fair wage from 
                                                 
25 For example, if division A’s actual unit (total) cost is 1.4 (1400) Liras, manager A’s available slack by lying to the 
maximum extent (i.e., claiming 3000 Liras as his cost) is 1600 Liras. If manager A reported 2500 Liras as his cost, 
he therefore claimed 1100-Lira slack (=2500-1400). His reporting honesty=1-1100/1600=31.25%. 
 
26 For example, if participant A1 is matched with five lying partners and A1 only blows the whistle twice; the 
percentage of whistle blowing for A1 will be 40%. 
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the owner, their reporting honesty is very high. When they receive the unfair wage, their 
reporting is much less honest. In the same spirit, in both communication conditions, more 
overstatements of cost are observed when the managers receive the unfair wage than when they 
receive the fair wage. Additionally, despite the high reward for whistle blowing, not every 
manager turn in their lying peer. The percentage of whistle blowing is the lowest when the 
managers in CC face the unfair wage. Moreover, when the managers can communicate with each 
other, they send significantly more collusive messages and form significantly more collusive 
agreements when they receive the unfair wage than when they receive the fair wage. Comparing 
the results in CC with those in NCC, the managers' ability to communicate reduces the managers' 
reporting honesty and the percentage of whistle blowing when they receive the fair wage, but not 
when they receive the unfair wage. 
7.2.2 Tests of H1a and H1b 
H1a predicts that in NCC, when managers are not able to communicate with each other, 
they will report more honestly when they receive the fair wage from the owner than when they 
receive the unfair wage. Results are consistent with H1a. As shown in Table 2-Panel B, the 
managers' mean reporting honesty is 92% when they receive the fair wage and 72% when they 
receive the unfair wage. Table 3 shows the results of a linear mixed model test. The linear mixed 
model is used to test the effect of wage on the managers’ reporting honesty after adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity due to repeated observations within subject. Wage is found to have 
significantly affected managers’ reporting honesty (F=19.80, p<0.001), supporting H1a. 
Decreasing the wage from 1000 Liras to 500 Liras decreases a manager’s reporting honesty by 
approximately 0.21 (t=-4.46, p<0.001). Experimental period does not significantly affect the 
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managers’ reporting honesty (F=0.30, p=0.59). Replacing wage with the managers' fairness 
rating as the independent variable leads to similar results. Fairness rating significantly affects the 
managers’ reporting honesty (F=5.28, p<0.001).  
In NCC, a total of 51 overstatements are observed across the eight periods. As shown in 
Table 2-Panel B, 11 overstatements are observed when managers receive the fair wage; 40 are 
observed when managers receive the unfair wage. A logistic mixed regression using the 
“overstate or not” dummy as the dependent variable indicates that wage significantly affects 
managers’ likelihood to overstate, further supporting H1a (p<0.001).  
H1b predicts that the percentage of whistle blowing on peer's overstatement will be 
higher when managers in NCC receive the fair wage than when they receive the unfair wage. In 
NCC, when the managers receive the fair wage, ten out of the 11 overstatements (91%) are 
turned in. When the managers receive the unfair wage, 22 out of 40 overstatements (55%) are 
turned in. The results are in the direction of H1b. However, the difference in percentage of 
whistle blowing across the two wage conditions is not statistically significant (t=0.56, p=0.28).  
The insignificant result is probably due to the fact that only 11 overstatements are observed when 
the managers receive the fair wage from the owners and this leaves little opportunity for whistle 
blowing in the fair wage situation. Consequently, the test has very limited power. 
 
7.2.3 Tests of H2a and H2b 
H2a predicts that in CC, when managers are able to communicate with each other, they 
will report more honestly when they receive the fair wage from the owner than when they 
receive the unfair wage. Results are consistent with H2a. As shown in Table 2- Panel B, the 
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managers' mean reporting honesty is 89% when they receive the fair wage and 60% when they 
receive the unfair wage. Table 4 presents the managers' reporting honesty in CC by experimental 
period, and the results of the linear mixed model test. Again, wage significantly affects the 
managers' reporting honesty (F=6.52, p=0.01). Decreasing the wage level from 1000 Liras to 500 
Liras decreases the managers' reporting honesty by 0.24 (t=-2.55, p<0.01). H2a is supported. 
Experimental period does not significantly affect the managers' reporting honesty (F=0.13, 
p=0.73). The participants' reporting behaviors are rather consistent across periods.  Replacing 
wage with fairness rating in the model generates slightly weaker results. Fairness rating is 
significantly related with the managers' reporting honesty at a 0.10 level (F=2.01, p=0.08).  
In CC, a total of 59 overstatements are observed across the eight periods. As shown in 
Table 2-Panel B, only three overstatements are observed when managers receive the fair wage; 
the remaining 56 overstatements are observed when managers receive the unfair wage. A logistic 
mixed regression using the “overstate or not” dummy as the dependent variable indicates that 
wage significantly affects managers’ likelihood to overstate, further supporting H2a (p<0.001).  
H2b predicts that the percentage of whistle blowing on peer's overstatement will be 
higher when managers in CC receive the fair wage than when they receive the unfair wage. 
When the managers receive the fair wage, two out of the three overstatements (67%) are turned 
in. When the managers receive the unfair wage, 20 out of 56 overstatements (36%) are turned in. 
Again, the results are in the direction of H2b but not statistically significant (t=0.47, p=0.34). 
The test has very limited power given the fact that only three overstatements are observed in the 
unfair condition, leaving very little opportunity for whistle blowing. 
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7.2.4 Tests of H2c and H2d 
H2c predicts that in CC, when the managers are given the opportunity to communicate 
with each other, they will send more collusive messages to each other when they receive the 
unfair wage than when they receive the fair wage. A message is coded as collusive if it expresses 
an intention to overstate the cost and/or to cover for each other.27 For example, the message 
"Overstate to the max and no ratting" is coded as collusive. Another example of collusive 
message is “let’s overstate to the max and agree to say honest for each other. We can make the 
most money that way." An example of non-collusive message is "I get paid more this time. My 
wage is a lot. Let's be honest." A blank message is also coded as non-collusive.  
As shown in Table 2-Panel B, when the managers receive the unfair wage, 92% of the 
times they send a final collusive message to the other manager. 28 When they receive the fair 
wage, 50% of the times they send a final collusive message to the other manager. Table 5 reports 
the number of final collusive messages sent by each individual manager. The table also shows 
the percentage of times each manager sends a final collusive message when he/she receives the 
unfair wage (percentage U), and the percentage of times each managers sends a final collusive 
message when he/she receives the fair wage (percentage F). A paired t-test is run to compare 
percentage U with percentage F. The result indicates that wage significantly affects the 
percentage of collusive messages sent by the managers (t=3.07, p=0.01 two-tailed), supporting 
H2c. A logistic mixed regression using "send final collusive message or not" dummy (1=sent, 
                                                 
27 The messages were independently coded by the author and two other doctoral students. The results are compared 
and there is unanimous agreement among the coders.  
 
28 Final collusive messages refer to the collusive messages sent by the managers in their final (second) round of 
communication. The number of collusive messages sent in the first round is not significantly different from that in 
the final round.  
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0=do not send) as the dependent variable further supports H2c—higher wage is associated with a 
smaller likelihood of sending a collusive message after controlling for repeated observation 
within subjects (t=-4.98, p<0.001). Replacing wage with fairness rating in the regression shows 
similar result. Rating coefficient is negative and significant (t=-4.33, p<0.001).29  
As an additional analysis, I also compared the managers’ tendency to treat the final 
collusive messages they send as “cheap talk” across the wage conditions. I compared the 
percentage of times the managers renege on their collusive messages across the wage conditions. 
In the unfair wage condition, after the managers send a final collusive message to their partners, 
50% of the times they do NOT overstate. In the fair wage condition, after the managers send a 
final collusive message to their partners, 77% of the times they do NOT overstate (χ2=3.38, 
p=0.07). This provides preliminary evidence that the collusive communication is less likely to 
take effect when the managers perceive the owner to be fair.  
H2d predicts that in CC, the managers will form more collusive agreements with each 
other when they receive the unfair wage than when they receive the fair wage. Table 6 reports 
the number of final collusive agreements formed between manager pairs across wage conditions. 
A final collusive agreement is formed if both managers send a final collusive message to each 
other. As shown in the table, only three out of the 13 manager pairs (23%) who receive the 1000-
Lira wage offer form a final collusive agreement. In contrast, 52 out of the 59 manager pairs 
(88%) who receive the 500-Lira wage offer form a final collusive agreement. The difference is 
statistically significant (χ2=25, p<0.001), supporting H2d.30
                                                 
29 Both wage and fairness ratings are found to be significantly associated with the managers’ likelihood of initiating 
a first collusive message. 
 
30 I also analyze the percentage of times the managers renege on their final collusive agreements. As we know, very 
few final collusive agreements are formed in the fair wage condition, leaving limited sample size for me when I try 
to analyze the rate of reneging on collusive agreements in the fair wage condition and compare the rate to that in the 
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7.2.5 Tests of H3a and H3b 
 H3a suggests that when the managers receive the unfair wage, their ability to 
communicate with each other will reduce their reporting honesty. As shown in Table 2-Panel B, 
when the managers receive the unfair wage, their mean reporting honesty in NCC is 72% and 
their mean reporting honesty in CC is 60%. A univariate analysis is run to test the effect of 
communication condition on the managers’ reporting honesty when the managers receive the 
unfair wage. The results are shown in Table 7. Communication condition is found to have a 
significant effect on the managers’ reporting honesty when the wage is unfair (F=5.00, p=0.03). 
This suggests that the managers’ ability to communicate with each other in CC significantly 
decreases the managers’ reporting honesty when they receive the unfair wage, supporting H3a.  
H3b suggests that when the managers receive the unfair wage, their ability to 
communicate with each other will reduce the percentage of whistle blowing on lying peers. As 
shown in Table 2-Panel B, when the managers receive the unfair wage, the percentage of whistle 
blowing is 55% in NCC and 36% in CC (χ2=3.53, p=0.06). This suggests that, when the 
managers receive the unfair wage, their ability to communicate with each other in CC decreases 
their likelihood to blow the whistle, supporting H3b. Table 8 reports the result of a univariate 
analysis using individual managers’ whistle blowing percentage as the dependent variable. 
Communication is found to have significantly decreased the managers’ whistle blowing 
percentage, further supporting H3b (F=39.60, p<0.001).   
                                                                                                                                                             
unfair wage condition. When the managers receive the fair wage offer, 67% of the times they decide NOT to 
overstate their own costs, after forming a final collusive agreement with their partners. When the managers receive 
the unfair wage offer from the owner, 51% of the times they decide NOT to overstate their own costs after forming a 
final collusive agreement. The difference is not significant possibly because of the size problem in the fair wage 
condition (χ2=0.56, p=0.45).  
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7.2.6 Tests of RQ1 and RQ2 
RQ1 asks whether managers’ ability to communicate with each other decreases their 
reporting honesty when they receive the fair wage from the owner. As shown in Table 2-Panel B, 
when the managers receive the fair wage, their mean reporting honesty in NCC is 92% and their 
mean reporting honesty in CC is 89%. A univariate analysis is run to test whether 
communication condition affects the managers’ reporting honesty when the wage is fair. Results 
suggest that communication condition does not significantly affect the managers’ reporting 
honesty when they receive the fair wage (F=0.33, p=0.57). These findings suggest that when the 
managers receive the fair wage, their reporting honesty is very high in both communication 
conditions and their ability to communicate does not decrease their reporting honesty. 
RQ2 asks whether managers’ ability to communicate with each other decreases their 
percentage of whistle blowing on lying peers when they receive the fair wage from the owner. 
As shown in Table 2-Panel B, when the managers receive the fair wage in NCC, 11 
overstatements are observed, ten of these overstatements are turned in. When the managers 
receive the fair wage in CC, three overstatements are observed, two of these overstatements are 
turned in. The difference across conditions is not statistically significant (χ2=1.13, p=0.29). The 
managers’ ability to communicate with each other does not seem to have decreased the 
managers’ percentage of whistle blowing when they receive the fair wage. However, this 
statement must be interpreted with caution due to the small power of the test. 
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7.3 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES ON THE OWNERS 
7.3.1 The Owners' Wage Choices-A Detailed Look 
Although the owners’ behaviors are not the focus of this study, it is interesting to see how 
the owners choose the wage given the peer reporting system. As mentioned earlier, contrary to 
the wealth maximizing prediction, the owners choose a significant number of 1000-Lira wages in 
both communication conditions. Further more, comparing the wage offered across the two 
communication conditions suggests that the owners are significantly less likely (χ2=21.2, p<0.01) 
to offer the 1000-Lira wage in CC (when they know that the managers can communicate with 
each other) than in NCC (when they know that the managers can NOT communicate with each 
other). Comparing the number of 1000-Lira wages received by each manager in the two 
communication conditions further demonstrates that the owners send significant more fair wage 
offers in NCC than in CC (t=5.49, p<0.001). The owners' responses in the post experimental 
questionnaire suggest that the owners in CC are concerned that communication may lead the 
managers to collude against them, and they are reluctant to offer the 1000-Lira wage to the 
managers when this possibility exists. One explanation for this finding may be suggested by 
Rankin et al. (2005). They find that when the subordinates in their study do not have unilateral 
authority on their budget proposals, they frame the budgeting situation as one of strategic 
negotiation with the superior rather than as an ethical dilemma. As a result, the subordinates’ 
preference for honesty is crowded out and their honesty in reporting decreases. In this 
dissertation, the owners in CC may feel that the managers’ communication ability challenges the 
owners’ authority and control in the experiment, and they frame the situation in CC as one with 
primarily economic and strategic connotations rather than one with ethical/fairness implications. 
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As a result, the owners' non-pecuniary motivation, such as treating the managers fairly by 
offering them a higher-than-minimum wage, is reduced significantly. An alternative explanation 
for this finding may be suggested by Evans et al. (1994). In their study, the owner experiences 
disutility from the possibility of being exploited by the managers to whom the owner has 
entrusted his/her assets. The owners in Evans et al. (1994) are willing to pay to avoid the 
possibility of being exploited and to attain accountability. Accountability in their study refers to 
the likelihood that the firm’s managers do not falsify reports in order to misappropriate the firm’s 
assets. Applying their results to the current study would suggest that the owners may feel that 
they can expect less accountability from the managers in CC because of the increased likelihood 
of collusion between the managers. Therefore, the owners need to compensate for the disutility 
they experience (from the possibility of being taken advantage of) by offering a lower wage to 
the managers. Future studies may want to explore this further. 
7.3.2 The Owners' Share of the Divisions’ Gross Margin and the Owners’ Final Payoff 
In this section, I report how the owner’s share of the divisions’ Gross Margin (π) and 
their final payoff in this experiment are affected by fairness and communication under the peer 
reporting system.  
The owner's share of the divisions’ Gross Margin (π) reflects the extent to which the 
managers expropriate the surplus from the divisions under the peer reporting system. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the size of π is jointly determined by the managers' reporting honesty and 
the extent of whistle blowing on any dishonest report. Results show that π is positively 
associated with wage. When the owners offer the fair wage, the average π in the two 
communication conditions is 99.0%, indicating that the owners receive an average of 99.0% of 
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the two divisions’ Gross Margin. The percentage is virtually identical with the economic 
prediction (100%), demonstrating that the peer reporting system works almost perfectly when the 
owners offer the fair wage to the managers.  In contrast, when the owners offer the unfair wage, 
the average π significantly decreases to 79.9% (t=-5.61, p<0.001, two-tailed). Additionally, the 
managers’ ability to communicate with each other also has a significant impact on π. The owners 
in NCC receive an average of 93.1% of the Gross Margin, whereas the owners in CC receive an 
average of 78.4% (t=-3.19, p=0.002, two-tailed). Table 9 shows the owner’s share of the 
divisions’ Gross Margin (π) by wage and communication conditions. As shown in the table, 
when the owners offer the fair wage to the managers, the managers’ ability to communicate with 
each other does not significantly affect the size of π (t=-0.97 p=0.35, two-tailed). However, when 
the owners offer the unfair wage to the managers, the managers’ ability to communicate with 
each other significantly decreases the size of π (t=-2.26, p=0.03, two-tailed).  
As shown in Table 9, the largest increase in π, 22.3%, results from increasing the wage 
offer from 500 Liras to 1000 Liras in CC. As analyzed in Chapter 6, the owners are economically 
better off offering the fair wage only if increasing the wage from 500-Lira to 1000-Lira can 
increase π by more than 50%. The increase in π in the current experiment is less than 50%, and 
therefore can not cover the increase in the wage expense. As a result, the owners in the current 
study are better off offering the unfair wage to the managers. As shown in Table 10, considering 
the wage expense, the owners perform significantly better when offering the 500-Lira wage to 
the managers in both communication conditions. Nevertheless, the owners offer a significant 
number of fair wages to the managers, especially in NCC. This anomaly suggests that the owners 
are not pure wealth maximizers. Their wage choices are consistent with the notion that they have 
 78 
preference for fairness, particularly in NCC, when the owners feel that they have more control on 
the situation and they can expect more accountability from the managers. 
It should be noted that the result—the owners’ payoffs are higher when they offer the 
unfair wage—is largely affected by the parameters selected for the study. For example, the fact 
that auditing is costless in the current study introduces a bias in favor of the owners offering the 
unfair wage.  This is because managers overstate much more often when they receive the unfair 
wage than when they receive the fair wage. As a result, the owners have to call the auditor more 
frequently when they offer the unfair wage than when they offer the fair wage. If auditing is 
costly, the owners would incur an additional cost which will reduce their payoff and the presence 
of the auditing cost will make the selection of the unfair wage less desirable to the owners.   
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I summarize the results of my experiment and discuss this study’s 
contributions to theory and practice. I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of the 
limitations of this study and the potential avenues for future research. 
8.1 SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study experimentally tests the effect of a peer reporting system in inducing honesty 
in managerial reporting and how the effect is influenced by managers’ fairness perception of the 
owner (based on the wage offered to them by the owner) and manager communication. Results 
show that the peer reporting system is almost perfect in inducing honesty in managerial reporting 
when the managers perceive the owner to be fair. However, when the managers perceive the 
owner to be unfair, the managers' reporting honesty decreases significantly. In addition, despite 
the high reward for whistle blowing, the managers show a tendency to cover for each other when 
the owner is perceived as unfair.  
The results also indicate that the managers' perceived fairness of the owner affects how 
the managers utilize their communication opportunities under the peer reporting system. The 
managers in the communication condition send significantly more collusive messages and form 
significantly more collusive agreements when they perceive the owner to be unfair than when 
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they perceive the owner to be fair. Compared to the findings in the no communication condition, 
having the ability to communicate with each other significantly decreases the managers' 
reporting honesty as well as the extent of whistle blowing only when the managers perceive the 
owner to be unfair. When they perceive the owner to be fair, the ability to communicate does not 
significantly affect the managers' reporting or whistle blowing behaviors.  
Control systems relying on peer monitoring are frequently observed in practice and they 
represent a potentially cost effective way to improve the principal’s contractual position. This 
study contributes to the literature by providing an experimental test of the effectiveness of a 
theoretically optimal peer reporting system in eliciting honest reports from the agents. Results 
indicate that the peer reporting system can be a useful tool in eliciting honesty in managerial 
reporting. In addition, the effectiveness of this system can be affected by factors outside 
conventional agency theory and such factors may need to be considered in incentive contracting 
design. These results are important to academic scholars who are interested in budgeting and 
control issues in multi-agent settings.  
This dissertation also has implications for whistle blowing practices. The evidence 
presented in the current study suggests that people do not like to blow the whistle on others 
despite the monetary rewards for doing so.  However, agents feel more loyal to a principal who 
has treated them fairly, and are more likely to blow the whistle on a fellow agent who has taken 
advantage of a fair principal. In this situation, having the whistle blowing function as an internal 
control tool can potentially help the principal to restrain agents' opportunistic behaviors.  
The current study also enriches the empirical cheap talk literature. This study investigates 
a situation where the non-binding communication (cheap talk) between two players can not only 
affect the welfare of the two players, but also that of a third party. The results indicate that 
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whether the communication can lead the communicators to choose an outcome that is optimal to 
them at the detriment to the third party depends on the behavior of the third party and the 
communicators’ perception of the third party’s behavior. Specifically, the communicators choose 
the collusive outcome less frequently when they perceive the third party’s behavior as fair. The 
above evidence also provides useful insights into the role of communication in business 
practices. Modern organizations put forth costly effort to encourage communication among 
agents. This study suggests that agent communication can be a double-edged sword for 
organizations. When the agents view the principal as fair, communication is likely to enhance 
cooperation and productivity, and is unlikely to enforce low work norms among the agents. On 
the other hand, if the agents share an unfair perception of the principal, communication can lead 
to collusion and other counter-productive activities.  
This paper responds to the recent calls for studies on control issues in a multi-person 
setting (Sprinkle 2003) and for accounting research that integrates economic and behavioral 
factors (Kachelmeier 1994; Luft 1997; Moser 1998). The approach of the study is also consistent 
with Evans and Moser (2004), who argue that it is important for experiments to have a clear 
economic prediction against which to compare actual behavior. 
8.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Certain limitations of this study may raise potential external validity concerns. At the 
same time, these limitations provide opportunities for future research. For example, this study 
makes a simplifying assumption that there is no information asymmetry among the agents, 
whereas in business practice, although the information asymmetry among certain agents is 
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usually much lower than that between the principal and the agents, it is unlikely that the agents 
can obtain perfect information about each other. Future studies should examine the effect of the 
peer reporting system in a situation where the agents can imperfectly observe each other’s 
private information.  
For experimental control purposes, I investigate managerial honesty in a reporting 
context with no uncertainty. In other words, in my setting, slack represents expropriation of rents 
by the managers and if the managers overstate their costs, it indicates with certainty that they do 
so for opportunistic reasons. However, in business practice, some level of slack may be desirable 
to the organization and not necessarily dishonest. Slack can be beneficial to the organization by 
reducing manager tension, increasing organizational resiliency to change, protecting the 
organization against uncertainty in the environment, and by making available some resources 
that can be used for innovation (Sprinkle 2003, Merchant 1998). It is unclear how closely my 
results would generalize to the above uncertain environments.  
Finally, the owners in this experiment are not allowed to communicate with the 
managers. In addition, the owners can not choose whether they want to adopt the peer reporting 
system in the experiment. In future studies, giving the owners more choice and allowing the 
owner to play a more active role may influence the managers’ fairness perceptions and honesty 
level.  These and other potential limitations suggest a fruitful area for future research. 
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TABLE 1:  THE MANAGERS' EXPECTED PAYOFFS 
PANEL A: THE MANAGERS' EXPECTED PAYOFFS WHEN WAGE=500 
 
 
 Manager B's reporting choices (report Actual cost or Overstate) and  
whistle blowing choices (report manager A as Honest or Dishonest) 
 
 O, D O, H A, D A, H 
O, D 500, 500 2500, -500 -2500, 500 -500, -500 
O, H -500, 2500 
Manager A's 
reporting 
choices (report 
Actual cost 
or Overstate) 1500, 1500 collusive 
outcome 
-500, 1500 1500, 500 
A, D 500, -2500 1500, -500 -2500, -2500 -1500, -500 
A, H -500, -500 500, 1500 -500, -1500 500, 50031
and whistle 
blowing 
choices (report 
manager B as 
Honest or 
Dishonest) 
                                                 
 31  The two numbers in each cell represent the payoffs to manager A and manager B, respectively. The highlighted 
cells represent the unique Nash equilibria of the four stage-two subgames.  
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 PANEL B: THE MANAGERS' EXPECTED PAYOFFS WHEN WAGE=1000 
Manager B's reporting choices (report Actual cost or Overstate) and  
whistle blowing choices (report manager A as Honest or Dishonest) 
 O, D O, H A, D A, H 
O, D 1000, 1000 3000, 0 -2000, 1000 0, 0 
O, H 0, 3000 
Manager A's 
reporting 
choices (report 
Actual cost 
or Overstate) 2000, 2000 
collusive 
outcome 
0, 2000 2000, 1000 
A, D 1000, -2000 2000, 0 -2000, -2000 -1000, 0 
A, H 0, 0 1000, 2000 0, -1000 1000, 1000 
and whistle 
blowing 
choices (report 
manager B as 
Honest or 
Dishonest) 
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TABLE 2: WEALTH MAXIMIZING PREDICTIONS VERSUS RESULTS 
PANEL A: WEALTH MAXIMIZING PREDICTIONS 
NCC CC Wage Level 
500-Lira 1000-Lira 500-Lira 1000-Lira 
% of Wage Offers  100% 0% 100% 0% 
Reporting Honesty  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of 
Overstatements  0 0 0 0 
% of Whistle Blowing  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
PANEL B: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
NCC CC Wage Level 
(Fairness Rating) 500-Lira 
(2.3) 
1000-Lira 
(6.3) 
500-Lira 
(2.2) 
1000-Lira 
(5.7) 
% of Wage Offers  58% =(92/160) 
42% 
(=68/160) 
82% 
(=118/144) 
18% 
(=26/144) 
Reporting Honesty  72% 92% 60% 89% 
Number of 
Overstatements  40 11 56 3 
% of Whistle Blowing  55% (=22/40) 
91% 
(=10/11) 
36% 
(=20/56) 
67% 
(=2/3) 
% of Collusive 
Messages Sent - - 
92% 
(=108/118) 
50% 
(=13/26) 
% of Collusive 
Agreements Formed - - 
88% 
(=52/59) 
23% 
(=3/13) 
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TABLE 3: REPORTING HONESTY IN NCC 
 Reporting Honesty by Period (NCC) 
Experimental Period 500-Lira (Unfair) Wage 1000-Lira (Fair) Wage 
1 97% (n=8) 98% (n=12) 
2 79% (n=6) 87% (n=14) 
3 62% (n=10) 79% (n=10) 
4 66% (n=15) 100% (n=5) 
5 81% (n=11) 100% (n=9) 
6 49% (n=12) 100% (n=8) 
7 68% (n=16) 100% (n=4) 
8 82% (n=14) 83% (n=6) 
Total 72% (n=92) 92% (n=68) 
 
 Mixed Model Analysis on Reporting Honesty in NCC--Test of Fixed Factors 
Source F Sig. 
Intercept 142.18 0.00 
Wage 19.80 0.00 
Period 0.30 0.59 
 
Mixed Model Analysis on Reporting Honesty in NCC--Estimates of Fixed Factors 
Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
df t Sig. 
Intercept 0.96 0.07 63.27 13.15 0.00 
Wage=500 -0.21 0.05 126.60 -4.45 0.00 
Wage=1000 - - - - - 
Period -0.01 0.01 44.75 -0.54 0.59 
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TABLE 4: REPORTING HONESTY IN CC 
 Reporting Honesty by Period (CC) 
Experimental Period 500-Lira (Unfair) Wage 1000-Lira (Fair) Wage 
1 65% (n=14) 100% (n=4) 
2 50% (n=16) 7% (n=2) 
3 51% (n=14) 100% (n=4) 
4 73% (n=14) 100% (n=4) 
5 59% (n=16) 100% (n=2) 
6 65% (n=18) N/A (n=0) 
7 41% (n=12) 100% (n=6) 
8 71% (n=14) 75% (n=4) 
Total 60% (n=118) 89% (n=26) 
 
Mixed Model Analysis on Reporting Honesty in CC--Test of Fixed Factors 
Source F Sig. 
Intercept 52.95 0.00 
Wage 6.52 0.01 
Period 0.13 0.73 
 
Mixed Model Analysis on Reporting Honesty in CC--Estimates of Fixed Factors 
Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
df t Sig. 
Intercept 0.82 0.12 100.18 6.85 0.00 
Wage=500 -0.24 0.09 139.41 -2.55 0.01 
Wage=1000 - - - - - 
Period 0.01 0.02 35.09 0.35 0.73 
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TABLE 5: NUMBER OF FINAL COLLUSIVE MESSAGES SENT ACROSS WAGES  
500-Lira Wage (Unfair) 1000-Lira Wage (Fair) 
Participant  
# of 500-
Lira Wage 
received 
# of Final 
Collusive 
Message Sent Percentage U
# of 1000-
Lira Wage 
received 
# of Final 
Collusive 
Message Sent Percentage F 
23 8 7 88% - - - 
24 5 3 60% 3 0 0% 
25 4 4 100% 4 1 25% 
26 7 6 86% 1 1 100% 
27 8 8 100% - - - 
28 6 6 100% 2 2 100% 
29 8 8 100% - - -  
30 6 6 100% 2 2 100% 
31 7 7 100% 1 1 100% 
32 4 3 75% 4 3 75% 
33 6 5 83% 2 1 50% 
34 7 5 71% 1 0 0% 
35 7 7 100% 1 0 0% 
36 7 7 100% 1 1 100% 
37 6 6 100% 2 0 0% 
38 6 5 83% 2 1 50% 
39 8 8 100% - - - 
40 8 7 88% - - - 
Total 118 108 92%  26 13  50% 
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TABLE 6: NUMBER OF COLLUSIVE AGREEMENTS FORMED ACROSS WAGES 
 
Number of Manager 
Pairs Who Received  
the Unfair Wage 
Number of Manager 
Pairs Who Received 
the Fair Wage 
Total 
Did Not 
Form 
Collusive 
Agreement 
Count 
% of Total 
7 
11.9% 
10 
76.9% 
17 
23.6% 
Formed 
Collusive 
Agreement 
Count 
% of Total 
52 
88.1% 
3 
23.1% 
55 
76.4% 
Total 59 13 72 
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TABLE 7: COMPARING REPORTING HONESTY ACROSS COMMUNICATION 
CONDITIONS WHEN WAGE=500 
Dependent Variable: Managers’ Reporting Honesty when Wage=500  
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Communication (1=yes, 0=no) 1 0.95 5.00 0.03 
Period 7 0.24 1.25 0.28 
Communication * Period 7 0.19 1.02 0.42 
Error 194 0.19   
Total 210    
Corrected Total 209    
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 TABLE 8: COMPARING WHISTLE BLOWING ACROSS COMMUNICATION 
CONDITIONS WHEN WAGE=500 
Dependent Variable: Individual Whistle Blowing Percentage when Wage=500  
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Communication (1=yes, 0=no) 1 2.42 39.58 0.00 
Error 28 0.06   
Total 30    
Corrected Total 29    
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TABLE 9: THE OWNERS' SHARE OF THE DIVISIONS' GROSS MARGIN (Π) 
 
π 
  500-Lira Wage  1000-Lira Wage  Difference  
NCC 
 88.1% (n=41) 99.9%(n=31) 
11.8% 
t=3.02, p<0.01 
(two-tailed) 
CC 
 74.3%(n=59) 96.6%(n=13) 
 
22.3% 
t=3.88, p<0.01 
 (two-tailed) 
Difference 
-13.8% 
t=-2.26 p=0.03 
(two-tailed) 
-3.3% 
t=-0.97 p=0.35  
(two-tailed) 
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TABLE 10: THE OWNERS' FINAL PAYOFF (IN LIRAS) 
 
The Owners’ Final Payoff  
  500-Lira Wage  1000-Lira Wage 
  
Difference  
NCC 
 2714.6 (n=41) 1958.1 (n=31) 
-756.5 
t=-7.16, p<0.01 
(two-tailed) 
CC 
 2431.4 (n=59) 1896.2 (n=13) 
 
-535.2 
t=-3.92, p<0.01 
 (two-tailed) 
Difference 
-283.2 
t=-2.21, p=0.03  
(two-tailed) 
-61.9 
t=-0.53, p=0.60 
(two-tailed) 
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FIGURE 1: TIMELINE IN EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
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FIGURE 2: THE OWNERS' EXPECTED PAYOFF (OEP) 
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions for the Managers (NCC) 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION   
This study is about decision-making in accounting. You will assume the role of a divisional 
manager throughout the experiment. The experiment will last eight periods. Each of you will be randomly 
grouped with another manager participant and an owner participant in each period. The amount of cash 
paid to you for participating in the experiment will depend on the decisions you and your group members 
make during the experiment. You will not be told who your group members are either during or after the 
experiment.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the administrator 
will answer your questions. Please do not talk with any participants other than the administrator 
after this point. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT 
You will play the role of either manager A or manager B throughout the experiment. Manager A 
and manager B are working as the head of Division A and Division B, respectively, for a manufacturing 
company. Manager A and B are responsible for reporting the production cost of their own division to the 
owner of the company. Manager A and B will be paid a wage for this job. This wage level is determined 
by the owner participants. 
 
As the head of Division A, manager A knows the exact cost of his/her own division, which falls 
within [1000 Liras, 1050 Liras, 1100 Liras,…, 3000 Liras]. Due to similarities in the working 
environment, manager A also knows the exact cost of division B, which falls within [4000 Liras, 4050 
Liras, 4100 Liras,…, 6000 Liras].  Likewise, manager B knows his/her division’s exact cost as well as the 
exact cost of division A. 
 
The owner knows that the distribution of division A’s cost falls within [1000 Liras, 1050 Liras, 
1100 Liras,…, 3000Liras], and division B’s cost falls within [4000 Liras, 4050 Liras, 4100 Liras,…, 
6000Liras]. However, the owner does NOT know the exact cost of either division.  
 
Your first task in each period is to report to the owner a cost for your own division. Your actual 
cost in each period will be determined by a random draw by the experimenter. Since the owner does NOT 
know the exact cost of your division, if your reported cost is above your actual cost, and if the owner does 
not call an auditor to check upon you, you may keep the difference as additional income.  
 
After reporting your divisional cost to the owner, you will learn the amount the other manager 
paired with you reported to the owner. If s/he overstated her/his cost to the owner, you can choose 
whether or not to inform the owner of this overstatement. If you do, the owner will call an auditor to 
check upon the other manager.  The other manager will be fined 1000 Liras for overstating; you will 
receive 1000 Liras reward for helping the owner learn the truth. However, if the other manager did NOT 
overstate and you falsely accuses him/her, the auditor will find this out and you will have to pay a 2000 
Lira fine.  
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Likewise, the other manager in your group will learn the amount you reported to the owner. If 
you overstated your cost, she/he can choose whether to inform the owner of your overstatement. If she/he 
does, you will be checked by an auditor and fined 1000 Liras, and the other manager will receive 1000 
Liras reward. The other manager will also be fined 2000 Liras if she/he falsely accuses you. 
 
PROCEDURES: 
 
1. The owner participant paired with you will decide the wage level for both you and the other 
manager. You will be informed of the owner’s decision. The owner must pay you and the other 
manager the same wage. 
 
2. On your desk, you will find eight blue papers and one pink paper with eight labels on it. When 
you peel label #1 off, you can see both manager A and manager B’s actual cost for period #1, and 
so on. Please do not peel any label off until the experimenter tells you to do so. Please do not 
look ahead to subsequent periods.  
 
3. Peel label #1 off from the pink paper.  Write down the cost you want to report to the owner on a 
blue paper. The experimenter will collect the blue paper from you and the other manager.  
 
4. The experimenter will give you a white paper documenting the cost reported by both you and the 
other manager. If you observe that the other manager overstated his/her cost, you can choose 
whether you will tell the owner about this by circling one of two choices on the white paper: 
Honest or Overstated. Note that while you know with certainty whether the other manager 
overstated his/her division’s cost, you may choose to circle either “Honest” or “Overstated”, 
regardless of what the other manager actually did. The experimenter will collect the white paper 
from you and pass it to the owner.  
At the same time, the other manager is making the same reporting decision on you. 
 
5. An administrator who does not know your identity will calculate the payoff for you, you will be 
informed of how much you earned for the period. 
 
6. The next period starts. 
 
COMPENSATION SCHEME: 
 
Compensation for you and the other manager in each period: 
 
The owner pays both you and the other manager a wage for your job. The owner can choose 
either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras as your wage level.32 Your and the other manager’s wage in each period 
will be determined by the owner matched with you in that period. Therefore, your wage level may vary 
from period to period, depending on the owner’s choice.  
 
However, you may receive greater than, equal to, or less than your wage in each period based on 
the decisions made by both you and the other manager. Specifically, 
? If the other manager reports that you overstated when reporting your cost, you will receive an 
amount equal to your wage minus a 1000 Lira fine  
                                                 
32 A pilot study was conducted in April 2005. In the pilot study, the average wage offered by the owner participants 
was 750 Liras. The owner participants in the current experiment are informed of this before they make their wage 
choices. 
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? If the other manager reports that you were honest when reporting your cost, you will receive your 
wage, plus you can keep any difference between your reported cost and your actual cost.  
? In addition, you can receive a 1000 lira bonus if you circle “Overstated” on your white paper, if 
and only if the other manager did overstate his/her cost. (Falsely accusing the other manager will 
result in a 2000 Lira fine for you) 
 
 Likewise, the other manager’s compensation will rely on his/her as well as your decisions. 
 
Compensation for the owner in each period: 
The owner’s compensation depends on both your decision and that of the other managers. 
Specifically, the owner’s compensation is determined as: 
  
(3000 Liras–manager A’s reimbursed cost) + (6000 Liras- manager B’s reimbursed cost) +2000 
Liras - wage paid to manager A and B  
 
 
Any Questions? 
 
The amount of cash you will take home from the experiment will be determined by the result of 
one period randomly selected from the periods played. For each 1000 Liras you earn in the experiment, 
you will receive $15.  
 
Reminder: Functions of Different Papers: 
Pink Papers Show your and the other manager’s actual cost in each period.  
Blue Papers Use them to report cost to the owner in each period 
White Papers Show your and the other manager’s reported cost in each period. You can also 
use them to inform the owner of the other manager’s overstatement, if any. 
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Post Experimental Questionnaires--Managers (NCC) 
Please indicate: 
Your Age________ 
Your Gender_______ 
How many years of working experience do you have ________ 
Your Major (Concentration) __________________ 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
1. Did you understand that your responses in the experiment would remain anonymous? 
  Yes    No  
 
2. Were you matched with the same owner participant in each period? 
Yes    No 
 
3. Were you matched with the same manager participant in each period? 
  Yes    No       
 
4. In each period, did you know the actual cost of the other manager with whom you were matched? 
Yes    No 
 
5. In each period, did you know whether the other manager with whom you were matched reported 
his/her actual cost honestly to the owner?  
Yes    No 
 
6. Was it possible for the owner to know whether a particular manager overstated his/her cost without 
the other manager informing the owner of the overstatement? 
Yes    No 
 
7. How fair did you perceive the owner to be when she/he offered you a 500-Lira wage? 
1        2  3      4  5       6  7 
Owner            Owner was             Owner 
was unfair        neither            was fair 
          fair nor unfair   
   
8. How fair did you perceive the owner to be when she/he offered you a 1000-Lira wage? 
1        2  3      4  5       6  7 
Owner            Owner was             Owner 
was unfair        neither            was fair 
          fair nor unfair   
     
9. During the experiment, did you ever not inform the owner that the other manager had overstated 
his/her cost? 
Yes    No 
If “Yes”, why did you not inform the owner that the other manager had overstated his/her cost?  
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Instructions for the Managers (CC) 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
 This study is about decision-making in accounting. You will assume the role of a divisional 
manager throughout the experiment. The experiment will last eight periods. Each of you will be randomly 
grouped with another manager participant and an owner participant in each period. The amount of cash 
paid to you for participating in the experiment will depend on the decisions you and your group members 
make during the experiment. You will not be told who your group members are either during or after the 
experiment.  
 If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the administrator 
will answer your questions. Please do not talk with any participants other than the administrator 
after this point. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 You will play the role of either manager A or manager B throughout the experiment. Manager A 
and manager B are working as the head of Division A and Division B, respectively, for a manufacturing 
company. Manager A and B are responsible for reporting the production cost of their own division to the 
owner of the company. Manager A and B will be paid a wage for this job. This wage level is determined 
by the owner participants. 
 
 As the head of Division A, manager A knows the exact cost of his/her own division, which falls 
within [1000 Liras, 1050 Liras, 1100 Liras,…, 3000 Liras]. Due to similarities in the working 
environment, manager A also knows the exact cost of division B, which falls within [4000 Liras, 4050 
Liras, 4100 Liras,…, 6000 Liras].  Likewise, manager B knows his/her division’s exact cost as well as the 
exact cost of division A. 
 
 The owner knows that the distribution of division A’s cost falls within [1000 Liras, 1050 Liras, 
1100 Liras,…, 3000 Liras], and division B’s cost falls within [4000 Liras, 4050 Liras, 4100 Liras,…, 
6000 Liras]. However, the owner DOES NOT know the exact cost of either division.  
 
 Your first task in each period is to report to the owner a cost for your own division. Your actual 
costs in each period are predetermined by the experimenter based on a random draw. Since the owner 
DOES NOT know the exact cost of your division, if your reported cost is above your actual cost, and if 
the owner does not call an auditor to check upon you, you may keep the difference as additional income.  
 
 After reporting your divisional cost to the owner, you will learn the amount the other manager 
paired with you reported to the owner. If s/he overstated her/his cost to the owner, you can choose 
whether or not to inform the owner of this overstatement. If you do, the owner will call an auditor to 
check upon the other manager.  The other manager will be fined 1000 Liras for overstating; you will 
receive 1000 Liras reward for helping the owner learn the truth. However, if the other manager did NOT 
overstate and you falsely accuses him/her, the auditor will find this out and you will have to pay a 2000 
Lira fine. 
 
 Likewise, the other manager in your group will learn the amount you reported to the owner. If 
you overstated your cost, she/he can choose whether to inform the owner of your overstatement. If she/he 
does, you will be checked by an auditor and fined 1000 Liras, and the other manager will receive 1000 
Liras reward. The other manager will also be fined 2000 Liras if she/he falsely accuses you. 
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PROCEDURES: 
 
1. The owner participant paired with you will decide the wage level for both you and the 
other manager. You will be informed of the owner’s decision. The owner must pay you and the 
other manager the same wage.  
 
2. On your desk, you will find eight pink papers with a label on each of them. When you 
peel label #1 off, you can see both manager A and manager B’s actual cost for period #1, and so 
on. Please do not peel any label off until the experimenter tells you to do so. Please do not 
look ahead to subsequent periods.  
 
3. There are eight envelopes on your desk. BEFORE you peel the label off in each period, 
you can use the pink paper to communicate with the other manager in your group (who will be 
sitting in another room after the experiment starts). You can put your pink paper in an envelope. 
The experimenter will pass the envelope to the other manager. You can communicate with the 
other manager TWICE in each period. You have 2 minutes to write down your message on 
the pink paper each time. 
 
4. After you get the pink paper back from the other manager, peel the label off. Write a cost 
you want to report to the owner for the period on a blue paper on your desk. The experimenter 
will collect the blue paper from you and the other manager.  
 
5. The experimenter will give you a white paper documenting the cost reported by both of 
you. If you observe that the other manager overstated his/her cost, you can choose whether you 
will tell the owner about this by circling one of two choices on the white paper: Honest or 
Overstated. Note that while you know with certainty whether the other manager overstated 
his/her division’s cost, you may choose to circle either “Honest” or “Overstated”, regardless of 
what the other manager actually did. The experimenter will collect the white paper from you and 
pass it to the owner. At the same time, the other manager is making the same reporting decision 
on you. 
 
6. An administrator who does not know your identity will calculate the payoff for you, you 
will be informed of how much you earned for the period. 
 
7. The next period starts. 
 
COMPENSATION SCHEME: 
 Compensation for you and the other manager in each period: 
  
 The owner pays both you and the other manager a wage for your job. The owner can choose 
either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras as your wage level.33 Your and the other manager’s wage in each period 
will be determined by the owner matched with you in that period. Therefore, your wage level may vary 
from period to period, depending on the owner’s choice.  
 
                                                 
33 A pilot study was conducted in April 2005. In the pilot study, the average wage offered by the owner participants 
was 750 Liras. The owner participants in the current experiment are informed of this before they make their wage 
choices. 
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 However, you may receive greater than, equal to, or less than your wage in each period based on 
the decisions made by both you and the other manager. Specifically, 
? If the other manager reports that you overstated when reporting your cost, you will 
receive an amount equal to your wage minus a 1000 Lira fine  
? If the other manager reports that you were honest when reporting your cost, you will 
receive your wage, plus you can keep any difference between your reported cost and your actual 
cost.  
? In addition, you can receive a 1000 lira bonus if you circle “Overstated” on your white 
paper, if and only if the other manager did overstate his/her cost. (Falsely accusing the other 
manager will result in a 2000 Lira fine for you) 
 
Likewise, the other manager’s compensation will rely on his/her as well as your decisions.  
 
 Compensation for the owner in each period: 
 The owner’s compensation depends on both your decision and that of the other managers. 
Specifically, the owner’s compensation is determined as: 
  
(3000 Liras–manager A’s reimbursed cost) + (6000 Liras- manager B’s reimbursed cost) +2000 Liras - 
wage paid to manager A and B  
 
 
Any Questions? 
 
The amount of cash you will take home from the experiment will be determined by the result of one 
period randomly selected from the periods played. For each 1000 Liras you earn in the experiment, you 
will receive $15.  
 
Functions of Different Papers: 
Pink Papers Show your and the other manager’s actual cost in each period. You can also use 
them to communicate with the other manager 
Blue Papers Use them to report cost to the owner in each period 
White Papers Show your and the other manager’s reported cost in each period. You can also 
use them to inform the owner of the other manager’s overstatement, if any. 
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Post Experimental Questionnaires--Managers (CC) 
Please indicate: 
Your Age________ 
Your Gender_______ 
How many years of working experience do you have ________ 
Your Major (Concentration) __________________ 
Please answer the following questions: 
1. Did you understand that your responses in the experiment would remain anonymous? 
  Yes    No  
 
2. Were you matched with the same owner participant in each period? 
Yes    No 
 
3. Were you matched with the same manager participant in each period? 
  Yes    No       
 
4. In each period, did you know the actual cost of the other manager with whom you were matched? 
Yes    No 
 
5. In each period, did you know whether the other manager with whom you were matched reported his/her actual 
cost honestly to the owner?  
Yes    No 
 
6. Was it possible for the owner to know whether a particular manager overstated his/her cost without the other 
manager informing the owner of the overstatement? 
Yes    No 
 
7. How fair did you perceive the owner to be when she/he offered you a 500-Lira wage? 
1        2  3      4  5       6  7 
Owner            Owner was             Owner 
was unfair        neither            was fair 
           fair nor unfair   
   
8. How fair did you perceive the owner to be when she/he offered you a 1000-Lira wage? 
1        2  3      4  5       6  7 
Owner            Owner was             Owner 
was unfair        neither            was fair 
           fair nor unfair   
     
9. During the experiment, did you ever not inform the owner that the other manager had overstated his/her cost? 
Yes    No 
If “Yes”, why did you not inform the owner that the other manager had overstated his/her cost?  
 
 
 
 
10. During the experiment, did you ever inform the owner that the other manager had overstated his/her cost, after 
you formed an agreement with the other manager to cover for each other?  
  Yes    No 
 If "Yes", why?  
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Instructions for the Owners (NCC) 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
This study is about decision-making in accounting. You will assume the role of an owner of a 
company throughout the experiment. The experiment will last eight periods. Each of you will be 
randomly grouped with two manager participants in each period. The amount of cash paid to you for 
participating in the experiment will depend on the decisions you and your group members make during 
the experiment. You will not be told who your group members are either during or after the experiment.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the administrator 
will answer your questions. Please do not talk with any participants other than the administrator 
after this point. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT 
You will play the role of an owner of a multidivisional company throughout the experiment. 
Your company hires two divisional managers A and B, who are responsible for producing 1000 units of 
product A and B, respectively, and reporting their division’s production cost to you.  
 
The actual cost of division A falls within [1000 Liras, 1050 Liras, 1100 Liras, … , 3000 Liras]. 
The actual cost of division B falls within [4000 Liras, 4050 Liras, 4100 Liras, … , 6000 Liras]. The actual 
cost of each division in each period is determined by a random draw by the experimenter. The manager 
participants will be informed of the exact actual cost of their own division as well as that of their peer’s 
division. You only know the range of each division’s cost. The manager participants decide how much 
cost they want to report to you in each period.  
 
In order to control managers’ potential opportunistic behaviors (overstating their costs), the firm 
establishes an internal control system which promotes peer mutual monitoring. Specifically, the system 
encourages each manager to indicate whether their peer has overstated his/her division’s actual cost. If 
any manager blows the whistle, the manager being accused will be fined 1000 Liras for overstating. An 
audit will take place (the experimenter will be the auditor). The whistle blower will be rewarded 1000 
Liras if the audit determines that the other manager indeed overstated the cost; the whistle blower will be 
fined 2000 Liras if the audit determines that the other manager did NOT overstate and the accusation was 
untruthful. 
 
Your compensation in the experiment is determined as: 
(3000 Liras -Manager A’s reported cost) + (6000 Liras -Manager B’s reported cost)+2000 Liras Other 
Income-Wages to A and B  if no manager blows the whistle 
 
(3000 Liras - Manager A’s reported cost) + (6000 Liras - Manager B’s actual cost) + 2000 Liras Other 
Income– Wages to A and B34  if manager A truthfully blows the whistle on B 
 
(3000 Liras - Manager A’s actual cost) + (6000 Liras - Manager B’s reported cost) + 2000 Liras 
Other Income-Wages to A and B if manager B truthfully blows the whistle on A 
 
(3000 Liras - Manager A’s actual cost) + (6000 Liras - Manager B’s actual cost) + 2000 Liras 
Other Income - Wages to A and B     if the managers truthfully blow the whistle on each other 
                                                 
34 The formula should include the penalty for the lying manager and the reward for the whistle blower. However, 
since both the penalty and the reward equal to 1000 Liras, the two items cancel out each other and have a net effect 
of zero on the owner’s compensation. Therefore, the two items are omitted from the formula. The same is true for 
the next two formulas.  
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Your task is to determine a wage for the two managers in each period (you can choose a different 
wage from period to period but the wage level for the two managers in each period must be the same). 
You can choose either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras as the wage level.35 Please remember: the manager 
participants will be informed that their wage level is determined by you at the beginning of each period. 
The managers who are grouped with you are NOT allowed to communicate with each other. 
 
  In each period, after you decide the wage level for the manager participants grouped with you, 
please write down the number on the green paper. 
 
The amount of cash you will take home from the experiment will be determined by the result of 
one period randomly selected from the periods played. For each 1000 Liras you earn in the experiment, 
you will receive $15. Thank you very much for participating! 
                                                 
35 A pilot study was conducted in April 2005. In the pilot study, the average wage offered by the owner participants 
was 750 Liras.  
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Post Experimental Questionnaires--Owners (NCC) 
 
Please indicate: 
 
Your Age ________ 
 
Your Gender_______ 
 
How many years of working experience do you have ________ 
 
Your major (concentration) _______________________ 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Did you understand that your responses in the experiment would remain anonymous? 
  Yes    No  
 
2. Were you matched with the same pair of manager participants in each period? 
  Yes    No       
 
3. Was it possible for you to know whether a manager overstated his/her cost without the other 
manager informing you of the overstatement? 
Yes    No 
 
4. During the experiment, did you ever offer the 1000 Lira wage to the managers with whom 
you were matched? 
Yes    No 
 
      If “Yes”, why did you offer the 1000 Lira wage? 
 
             
 
 
 
5.  During the experiment, did the fact that the managers can NOT communicate with 
each other affect your decision? 
  Yes    No 
 
 If "Yes", how?  
 
             
 
 
 
 107 
Instructions for the Owners (CC) 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
This study is about decision-making in accounting. You will assume the role of an owner of a 
company throughout the experiment. The experiment will last eight periods. Each of you will be 
randomly grouped with two manager participants in each period. The amount of cash paid to you for 
participating in the experiment will depend on the decisions you and your group members make during 
the experiment. You will not be told who your group members are either during or after the experiment.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the administrator 
will answer your questions. Please do not talk with any participants other than the administrator 
after this point. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT 
You will play the role of an owner of a multidivisional company throughout the experiment. 
Your company hires two divisional managers A and B, who are responsible for producing 1000 units of 
product A and B, respectively, and reporting their division’s production cost to you.  
 
The actual cost of division A falls within [1000 Liras, 1050 Liras, 1100 Liras, … , 3000 Liras]. 
The actual cost of division B falls within [4000 Liras, 4050 Liras, 4100 Liras, … , 6000 Liras]. The actual 
cost of each division in each period is determined by a random draw by the experimenter. The manager 
participants will be informed of the exact actual cost of their own division as well as that of their peer’s 
division. You only know the range of each division’s cost. The manager participants decide how much 
cost they want to report to you in each period.  
 
In order to control managers’ potential opportunistic behaviors (overstating their costs), the firm 
established an internal control system which promotes peer mutual monitoring. Specifically, the system 
encourages each manager to indicate whether their peer has overstated his/her division’s actual cost. If 
any manager blows the whistle, the manager being accused will be fined 1000 Liras for overstating. An 
audit will take place (the experimenter will be the auditor). The whistle blower will be rewarded 1000 
Liras if the audit determines that the other manager indeed overstated the cost; the whistle blower will be 
fined 2000 Liras if the audit determines that the other manager did NOT overstate and the accusation was 
untruthful. 
 
Your compensation in the experiment is determined as: 
(3000 Liras -Manager A’s reported cost) + (6000 Liras -Manager B’s reported cost)+2000 Liras Other 
Income-Wages to A and B  if no manager blows the whistle 
 
(3000 Liras - Manager A’s reported cost) + (6000 Liras - Manager B’s actual cost) + 2000 Liras Other 
Income– Wages to A and B36  if manager A truthfully blows the whistle on B 
 
(3000 Liras - Manager A’s actual cost) + (6000 Liras - Manager B’s reported cost) + 2000 Liras 
Other Income-Wages to A and B if manager B truthfully blows the whistle on A 
 
(3000 Liras - Manager A’s actual cost) + (6000 Liras - Manager B’s actual cost) + 2000 Liras 
Other Income - Wages to A and B     if the managers truthfully blow the whistle on each other 
                                                 
36 The formula should include the penalty for the lying manager and the reward for the whistle blower. However, 
since both the penalty and the reward equal to 1000 Liras, the two items cancel out each other and have a net effect 
of zero on the owner’s compensation. Therefore, the two items are omitted from the formula. The same is true for 
the next two formulas.  
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Your task is to determine a wage for the two managers in each period (you can choose a different 
wage from period to period but the wage level for the two managers in each period must be the same).  
You can choose either 500 Liras or 1000 Liras as the wage level.37 Please remember: the manager 
participants will be informed that their wage level is determined by you at the beginning of each period. 
The managers who are grouped with you are allowed to communicate with each other. 
 
  In each period, after you decide the wage level for the manager participants grouped with you, 
please write down the number on the green paper. 
 
The amount of cash you will take home from the experiment will be determined by the result of 
one period randomly selected from the periods played. For each 1000 Liras you earn in the experiment, 
you will receive $15. Thank you very much for participating! 
                                                 
37 A pilot study was conducted in April 2005. In the pilot study, the average wage offered by the owner participants 
was 750 Liras.  
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Post Experimental Questionnaires--Owners (CC) 
 
Please indicate: 
 
Your Age ________ 
 
Your Gender_______ 
 
How many years of working experience do you have ________ 
 
Your major (concentration) _______________________ 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Did you understand that your responses in the experiment would remain anonymous? 
  Yes    No  
 
2. Were you matched with the same pair of manager participants in each period? 
  Yes    No       
 
3. Was it possible for you to know whether a manager overstated his/her cost without the other manager 
informing you of the overstatement? 
Yes    No 
 
4. During the experiment, did you ever offer the 1000 Lira wage to the managers with whom you were 
matched? 
Yes    No 
 
      If “Yes”, why did you offer the 1000 Lira wage? 
 
 
             
 
 
 
5. During the experiment, did the fact that the managers can communicate with each other affect 
your decision? 
  Yes    No 
 
    If "Yes", how?  
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